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Summary findings
Anas and Lee present simulation results on the benefits  quantity purchased increases, because transmission gets
of alternative power tariffs for Nigeria and Indonesia,  congested.
based on several closely related models of the firm.  Simulations confirm that an increasing block tariff is
Nigeria is representative of developing countries where  optimal in each country and produces savings in the cost
the public sector is inefficient and manufacturers provide  of producing public power and in firms' operating costs
their own electricity to compensate for that inefficiency.  (including the firm's cost of producing power internally).
The use of private generators by Nigerian manufacturers  Under increasing block tariffs, firms that purchase more
is virtually ubiquitous, even though the government,  to  public power would be charged higher marginal prices
protect  its monopoly, did not encourage that use in the  than firms that purchase less.
1980s. About 89 percent of a sample of Nigerian firms  Large firms respond to the increasing block tariff by
produced  some of their power needs internally. But  expanding their generating capacity and reducing their
many large firms underused their power plants because  reliance on public power, while smaller firms contract
of the substantial quantity discounts public power  their capacities and buy more from the public sector.
offered to large manufacturers.  When congestion in transmission persists, cost savings
By contrast,  in Indonesia,  manufacturers were offered  are higher as the increasing block tariff reduces total use
only slight quantity discounts for public power.  of public power which in turn improves reliability.
Indonesia has encouraged manufacturers to produce  In Nigeria, where strong quantity discounts are
their own power.  About 61 percent of Indonesian  offered, total costs savings (for NEPA and
manufacturers produced  some power internally.  manufacturers) under  1989 conditions are about 4
Generally, in both countries firms purchase some  percent without congestion and increase to 9 percent
power from the public sector at a quantity discount  when there is some congestion.
(slight in Indonesia, considerable in Nigeria) and also  In Indonesia, where quantity discounts are mild,
produce  power internally at a declining marginal cost.  increasing the block tariff produces only slight cost
The reliability of public power declines as the total  savings.
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I.  INTRODUI
Our purpose in this report is to explore the welfare implications  of alternative pricing
schemes for publicly supplied electricity  when public supply is unreliable and competes with
private provision.  This will be done by  calibrating models based on  simple alternative
assumptions  about the firm's production technology  and then simulating  the responses of the
individual  firms in our sample  to hypothetical  changes  in NEPA's pricing  policy in Nigeria and
PLN's pricing policy in Indonesia.
Nigeria is  representative of those developing countries where the public sector is
inefficient  and private provision of electricity  by manufacturers  compensates  for public sector
inefficiency.  The use of private generators  among  Nigerian  manufacturers  is virtually  ubiquitous
even though  the Nigerian  government  did not encourage  the use of generators  in order to protect
NEPA's monopoly.  In our Nigerian  sample  collected  in 1988, 89% of the firms  produced  some
of their power needs intemally.  We also observed,  however, that many firms  underutilized  their
plant and also their generators.  This is because of the recessionary  conditions which prevailed
in the 1980's.
In Indonesia, PLN is fairly efficient  but its ability to supply  power in a reliable manner-2-
is strained  by the bottlenecks  created  due to the rapid growth of the Indonesian  economy. In this
situation  and unlike  Nigeria, the Indonesian  government  has encouraged  the production  of power
by manufacturers  and in  1991 has reduced the import tax on generators. In our Indonesian
sample, collected in  1992, 61 % of the manufacturers  produced some of their power needs
internally.
Another difference  between the two countries is that NEPA offers substantial  quantity
discounts  to manufacturers  and in 1988  was operating  far below cost recovery levels. By mid-
1989, NEPA was reported to have raised its tariff and achieved full recovery of its operating
costs. By contrast, in Indonesia  any quantity discount  offered to manufacturers  is very slight.
Also, PLN in 1992  was projected  to be recovering  139% of its operating  cost, probably in order
to finance capital expansion.
As explained  in Report No. 2, econometric  analysis revealed that in Nigeria public
electricity  supplies  are more limited  for small firms, and small firms face higher marginal  costs
in self provision. As a result, small firms value improvements  in the quantity and quality of
publicly supplied power more than large firms do. This higher valuation  was reflected  in the
higher shadow prices of electricity  for small firms.  In Nigeria, a one percent increase in the
quantity  of electric  power bought  resulted  in a 0.65 percent decrease  in the shadow  price (Report
No. 2).
A similar situation existed  in Indonesia  in 1992. Larger firms in Indonesia  may value
public power less than smaller firms do but the difference  in the valuations  of large and small
firms is not as large as it is in Nigeria. A one percent increase  in the quantity  of electric power
bought resulted in a 0.44 percent decrease in the shadow price (Report No.2).  However,-3  -
because of the rapid expansion  in the Indonesian  manufacturing  sector, there are many large
firms which attach high valuations  to public power.
We will measure firm size by the quantity of electricity a firm buys from the public
sector (NEPA or PLN). Current  pricing policy, in both countries, is to offer quantity  discounts
(though  these are slight in Indonesia,  they are but considerable  in Nigeria). Hence, firms which
purchase less public power are charged higher marginal  prices than are firms which purchase
more. This pricing scheme, which would be efficient if public supplies were reliable, favors
more intensive  power consumption  by the larger users and less by the smaller ones. In contrast,
an increasing  block tariff, if offered  by NEPA or PLN, would  induce the opposite  consumption
pattern by reducing the demands  for public power by the large users and increasing  it by the
smaller ones. This would have the benefit of reallocating  power to the smaller users who value
it more and away from the larger users who value it less. The larger users would incur higher
marginal  costs than they do at present as they responded  to the new tariff by switching  a part
of their supply from NEPA or PLN to their own generators.
Further cost-savings  from an increasing  block tariff would be realized if the new tariff
were such that the reduction  in the power bought by large users was more than the increase  in
the power bought by small users. If this were true, total power quantity purchased from the
public sector would fall and the degree of congestion  on the transmission  network would be
lower with the result that there would be fewer interruptions  in public power supplies. As a
result, all firms small and large, would  have less need to utilize  their own generators which are-4-
a more expensive source of power.'
While the above scenario makes intuitive  sense, our immediate  purpose in this chapter
is to substantiate  it at a quantitative  level by utilizing simple models  of the firm. In this spirit,
the chapter is organized into six sections.
In section II, we present a simple version of the theoretical model which is similar to
that developed  in Section  II of Report  2. In so doing we depart from the translog cost function
estimated in Report 2.  This departure is forced on us because of a well known technical
limitation  of the translog cost function. While these limitations  are not critical in econometric
estimation  they do pose a difficulty  in performing  simulations.
The chief limitation  is that translog is an approximate  cost function  which only locally
satisfies the concavity  and monotonicity  properties of the cost function and does not do so for
every sample point. Because of this, simulations  with the estimated translog coefficients  can
produce inconsistent  economic  behavior.  To circumvent  this problem in this chapter, we use the
Cobb-Douglas production function for the firm.  The production technology is separately
calibrated  for each firm so that the observed  behavior  of the firm is predicted  perfectly using the
calibrated coefficients.
Two alternative  Cobb-Douglas  specifications  are used. The first one assumes  that the two
types  of electricity  (publicly  supplied  and internally  generated  or embedded)  enter the production
function  as two essential  substitutes.  The second  specification,  introduced  in this report, assumes
that the two types  of electricity  are stnct compjements  to each  other but that electricity  is an
T  'Me presence of congestion in electricity transmission  is well documented  and strongly supported by anecdotal evidence.
Unfortunately, there is little data that can be used to relate the aggregate demand for power to the degree of power
breakdowns experienced by customers.-5-
essential substitute  with the other inputs.
Clearly, these two specifications  have different economic interpretations. In  the
essential substitutes case the  two electricities are assumed to  have different qualities and
production  cannot take place unless  both are used in positive quantities.  However, the finn has
flexibility in  substituting one  for the  other.  In  the  strict  complements case,  there  are
technological  constraints  related  to the unreliability  of the publicly  supplied  power. In this case,
the firm must use its own power source to complement  or boost the unreliable  power bought
from the public  sector. Firms are assumed  to use the two power sources  at a ratio which  is fixed
and determined  by the unreliability  of the public  sector. If publicly  supplied  power  becomes  less
reliable, firms increase  the ratio of privately generated  to publicly  supplied  power and operate
at a new fixed ratio.
In section  II we investigate  the economic  behavior  of the firm, under the assumption
that the two types of power are essential  substitutes.  In section  m we examine  the case of strict
complements.  In section  m  we also present a further extension  of the strict complements  case
by assuming  that the degree of unreliability  in the public  sector's power supply  is endogenously
determined.  This is based on the view that use of public power in Nigeria creates an externality
: if a firm buys more power from the public sector it congests  the transmission  network and
raises the rate of power disruptions  for all the firms buying from the public sector. A switch  by
a firm to its own generators confers a positive externality  on all firms by reducing the rate of
public  power unreliability  experienced  by all firms. While each firm can to some  extent directly
influence  the rate of power unreliability  which it experiences,  by investing  in voltage stabilizers,
that rate is made endogenous  largely by the level of aggregate  purchases from NEPA or PLN- 6 -
and is therefore influenced  by the tariff.
Section IV presents a set of simulations  for Nigeria based on the essential substitutes
and strict complements  models. We show  that an increasing  block tariff produces cost savings
for NEPA as well as for the smaller firms. Larger firms reduce their reliance on NEPA power
increasing  their use of their generators  and other inputs. Smaller  firms respond in the opposite
manner  by increasing  consumption  of NEPA power and relying less on their generators  and on
the other inputs.  The higher  costs of production  experienced  by the largest dozen or so firms are
more than offset by the cost savings  which accrue to all the smaller ones. NEPA's behavior  is
constrained  and assumed  to remain inefficient. We calibrate  the level of NEPA's offered tariff
by assuming  that it seeks to recover a given fraction  of its costs.
Lack of data did not allow us to measure  the degree to which public  power unreliability
is sensitive to the level of congestion.  To compensate  for this weakness, we have performed
simulations,  also reported in Section IV using alternative  assumptions  about the degree of this
sensitivity. Once congestion  is taken into account, then increases in NEPAs tariff have higher
benefits, especially for smaller firms, because, in the presence of improved reliability, these
firms reduce their dependence  on their own generators  and substitute  more  of the cheaper  NEPA
power for their own.
In  Section V,  the  results of  pricing simulations for Indonesia are  reported. The
simulations follow the example of those reported for Nigeria. However, in  the Indonesia
simulations,  we confined  our attention  to the strict complements  model  only since the results of
the two models  were similar. Also, we excluded  those firms which  did not have any generators
installed in 1992. While this sample  selection  makes the universe  of studied  firms superficially
comparable  to those in Nigeria, the findings  are quantitatively  quite different.- 7-
An increasing  block tariff produces positive benefits in the case of Indonesia as well.
However, the benefits are smaller in Indonesia  than they are in Nigeria because the Indonesian
tariff does not offer much  of a quantity  discount  as does the tariff in Nigeria. Also, our sample
of manufacturers  in Nigeria included  sveral  very large firms which used substantial  quantities
of NEPA power.  When these firms switch away from NEPA, large reductions in congestion
are realized.  In the case of Indonesia,  the largest firms do not account for as big a degree of
usage.  Hence, inducing  them to use their own generators  produces lower benefits.-8-
II.  THE ESSEN'AL  SUBSTTTUTES  MOD
The firm's cost minimization  problem is stated in general terms as:
(1)  Minimize C; = pL; L +  pM; M +  cj(wi,e)  + t(eN)
L,M,e,eN
subject  to:
(2)  Q(L,M,e,e,) =  Q.
Each firm i produces  the target output level Qj at the lowest  possible cost. The inputs of labor
(L) and raw materials  (M) are bought at the constant  prices pL;  and pM;.  Power from the public
sector (eN)  is purchased  at a quantity  discount. Therefore, the marginal  price declines  with the
quantity  purchased. The public sector's tariff is estimated  by the concave  function,
(3a)  ti(eN)  =  B  , eN/.
u; is a scale effect capturing  variations  in pricing which are specific to the firm. 2 The marginal
price calculated  from (3a) is:
(3b)  t;'(eN).=  N B Si  er'.
The cost of endogenously  generated  power  is measured  by the cost function  c3(wi,e).  The
inputs used in endogenous  power generation are labor, materials and generators. These are
assumed  purchased  at constant  prices given by the vector  w 1. Hence, the embedded  cost function
has the form:
2 In Nigeria, B  0.56678 and  - 0.67714. In Indonesia, B - 249.38 and 8 - 0.90972. The value of B is, of course,
a reflectiof of different monetary unitS  (nairas in Nigeria and rupiyahs in Indonesia). B,  however, reflects the degree of
quantity discount offered. The closer B is to one the lower the discount. These tariff equations given by (3a) were
estimated as simple regressions of In %(e,) against In em, with In B the regression constant and B  the slope coefficient.
The value of R'  was 59%  in Nigeria and 84% in Indonesia. This reflects the considerably higher variation in tariffs in
Nigeria. The variation is due to regional and industry specific differences in pricing.-9-
(4a)  ci(wi,e) =  G,e,
where a measures  the degree of scale economies  in embedded  electricity  production and G; is
a firm-specific  constant which measures  the effects of the input prices. 3 The marginal cost
calculated  from (4a) is:
(4b)  c1'(w1,e) =  a  Gie  .
Now consider the specification  of the firm's primary production function. We will use
the Cobb-Douglas  form with the two types of electricity  entering as essential  substitutes.
(5a)  Qi(L,M,e,eN)  =  A,i  &  *  ea°-  efNUN
We will assume that there is diminishing  retums with respect to each input which
requires that the exponent  be greater than zero but less than one.' Isoquants  will be convex to
the origin. (5a) implies that the two kinds of power have different qualities, acting as two
different inputs. Production  cannot occur unless each input is used in positive quantities.  The
isoquant  between e and eN  keeping L and M fixed is convex  to the origin and does not cut the
axes.
The shape  of the isocost  curve, keeping  L and M fixed, depends  on whether  NEPA offers
a decreasing  or increasing  block tariff. In both cases, the slope of the isocost line is,
de  atlaeN  $  B 6i  eN"
(6a)  - =-  <  0;
deN  ac/ae  a Gie'
3 This functional  form corresponds, for example, to an underlying embedded technology  which is Cobb-Douglas.  In that
case, GI  would be a Cobb-Douglas function of the embedded input prices with the exponents of the input prices being
the cost-shares of the embedded inputs in total embedded cost. Cobb-Douglas estimates of such cost functions gave a
= 0.55407 for Nigeria and a  =  0.3240 for Indonesia.
4  This condition was satisfied in calibration.- 10-
dle  t'(eN)  ,B1  la  t(e.)
(6b)  =,[  - ]  I
deN 2 c'(w,e)  a  c(w,e)
The sign of (6b) is positive  when a decreasing  block tariff is offered (quantity  discount,
,  <  1) insuring that the isocost is convex  to the origin and tangent to both axes with the cost
minimizing  solution occurring  as shown in Figure la.  When ,  =  l,a  constant block tariff is
offered  and the isocost is still convex  to the origin, is tangent  to the eN-axis  and cuts the e-axis.
Finally, when an increasing  block tariff is offered, the isocost obtains a skewed sigmoid shape
as shown  in Figure lb. In each case, we will assume that there is a single cost minimizing  point,
ruling out the possibility  that the isocost and isoquant "hug' each other.
Solving  the cost minimization  problem,  we obtain  the familiar  first order conditions,  (7a)-
(7c) below, which state that the rates of technical  substitution  between  each pair of inputs  equal
the ratio of the relevant inputs  prices. The only modification  in the present case is that marginal
rather than constant prices are used for e and eN:
(7a)  (pm/pL) - (am/aL) (L/M)  =  0,
(7b)  (ac./ae)pL;-'  - (aJ/a.)  (LJe) =  0,
(7c)  (ati/aeN)pLi'  - (aNi/aL;)  (LJeN)  =  0.
To these conditions  we add the output constraint:
(7d)  Qi = Ai  LLu ?O'  eai  e aNi
For each firm i, the above four equations (7a)-(7d)  are solved simultaneously  to find
the firm's choice of inputs Li, MK,  e;, eNs,  givyn  the constant  prices pL;,  pM;,  the embedded  cost
and tariff parameters  B, 5i,  f,  G 1, a, the production  function  coefficients  A,, au, a,4^,  a.,  aN,  and- 11  -
the output level Q.
Suppose  that the price of one input falls, then the firm will use more of that input and
less of each of the other inputs. The substitution  effect is even stronger when, because of
quantity  discounts,  marginal  prices fall with the quantity  used. Hence, suppose  that the marginal
price of public power falls (due to a shift in the tariff), then the firm will buy more public
power, will produce less from its own generators and will buy less labor and materials at
constant prices. As the firm buys more public power, the marginal  price of it will fall further
due to the decreasing  block tariff and as the firm produces.  less of its own power, the marginal
cost of its own power will rise due to the scale economy  in embedded  production.- 12 -
m.  THE STRICT COMPLEMENTS  MODEL
Our field observations  in both countries  strongly  suggested  the presence  of technological
constraints  with respect to power  use. In Nigeria, as well  as in Indonesia,  some firms  are forced
to use their own generators when public power fails while others use their own generators to
stabilize voltage fluctuations  in public  power. These observations  suggested  the possibility  that
the two kinds of power are complementary  rather than substitutable. Hence, our interest in
developing  a model  which treats this view.
In the strict complements  case, we specify  the production  function as,
(8a)  Qi(L,M,e,eN)  =  Ai LOLi  M  ai  (e + e  aEi
with the requirement  that e = bi eN,  which says  that the two electricities  must be used at a fuxed
atio, bi. The ratio is related to the reliability  of the public power source. If the public source
gets less reliable for firm i, then bi increases forcing the firm to use more e per unit of e,.
Alternatively, let E be the total quantity  of power used by the firm. Then, e  =  w, E is the
quantity internally generated and eN =  (1-T)E is the quantity bought from the public sector,
where vi is the fraction  of total power, E, which  is internally  generated.  Then clearly  b, =  TjI(l-
ir).  Making the appropriate substitutions  into (8a) we can now rewrite it as:
(8b)  Qi(L,M,b,eN)  =  (l+b  aD  Ai Lau ON  eN
This formulation  expresses  output  as a function  of public  power, labor and materials  and
shows clearly that the output of the firm also depends on the rate bi at which the firm boosts
public power with its endogenously  generated power : firms which operate at higher rates of- 13 -
boosting  will be more productive.  (8b) also shows that a higher rate of boosting  can be
substituted  for public  power. This is shown  in Figure  2. Rays through  the origin  represent
discrete  alternative  technologies  for  combining  public  power  with  endogenous  power.  The  higher
the slope  of a ray, the higher  the degree  to which  endogenous  power is used to boost (or
complement)  public  power.  Points  A and A', which  correspond  to the same  level of output,
represent two different quantities  of public power and two different rates of boosting. As we
shall see below, the rate of boosting  given by bi is determined  by two factors. One of these is
the degree of congestion  in the delivery of the public sector's power and the other is a firm-
specific effect representing the  firm's  investment in  equipment aimed to  regulate voltage
fluctuations  and other exogenous  characteristics  of the firm such as its location.
The cost minimization  problem of the firm can now be written as follows:
(9a)  Minimize Cl =  pL L + pM M + c,(wI,,iE) + tj([1-JE)
L,M,E
subject to:
(9b)  Qi(L,M,E) = Qi,
The Marshallian  optimization  conditions  for this problem are:
(lOa)  (,pf/pl)  - (am/aJ) (L/M) = 0,
(lOb)  [(acl/ae)T,  +  (at/aeN)(1-)J]pLj' - (a,ia,).(IJE)  = 0,
and the output constraint  given by (9b).
(lOa)  and (lOb) state that the rates of technical  substitution  between  labor and materials
atid labor and electricity equal the ratio of input prices. In the case of electricity the relevant
marginal price is the weighted  average of the marginal embedded  cost and the marginal tariff
price. Assuming that the latter is smaller than the former, a higher rate of  public sector- 14 -
unreliability  given by v; increases the weighted marginal price of E and, hence, the labor to
electricity  ratio in production.
For each firm  i, (lOa), (lOb)  and (9b)  are solved  simultaneously  to find the firm's choice
of inputs Lj, M;, and EA,  gjie  the constant  prices pL;,  pM;,  the parameters B, 5i, P, G;, a and
the production function coefficients  A,, aLu,  aM&,  a,,  the output level Q, and the exogenous  rate
of unreliability,  i,.
As a  next step we extend the above model further by  endogenizing the effect of
congestion on  the rate of unreliability. Although each firm faces an exogenous rate,  the
aggregate  demand for NEPA power determines  the rates of unreliability  faced by each firm.
Note first that the aggregate  demand for public sector power is:
(11)  D =  Ej  (I-  j)E,
where the summation  is over all the firms. Now suppose  that the following  function  determines
the rate of unreliability  faced by the iLh  firm
Di  DO
(12)  =  . =
I + Di D;  '+Di[j(l
Two influences  contribute  to this process. One, the aggregate  demand for public sector power,
D, affects all firms by raising the value of ari.  If 4 = 0, then aggregate  demand has no effect
and there is no congestion.  The higher the value of 4 > 0, the higher the congestion  effect. The
second influence is a firm-specific idiosyncratic  effect measured by the parameter Di. This
reflects such things as the firm's region or location within a region, the quality of the firm's
cable connections to the public power network, the quality of the firm's voltage stabilizing
equipment  etc. The lower the value of fl,  the lower the rate of unreliability  which is implied.- 15 -
This  suggests that  the  firm can  partially control its vulnerability to  the  public sector's
unreliability  by making investments  in equipment  and in logistical  procedures  which reduce the
value of fl  or even by changing  its location. In our simulations,  we will assume that n; are
exogenous  to the firm and remain fixed.
Equation  (12)  shows  that  the interruption  rates faced  by various firms  are interdependent
through  the congestion  externality:  given the firm-specific  Di's  and the n firm-specific  demands,
the Ei's, equilibrium  requires  that all n equations  must be simultaneously  solved  by a set of ii's.
Consider  the following  comparative  statics  argument.  Suppose  that a firm's Di  is reduced
exogenously. Ceteris,  paribus, this causes the rate of unreliability  to  fall. In Figure 2 this
corresponds  to the firm switching  from point A to point A' as it reduces its ()., requiring less
boosting  of public sector power  by its own. But higher reliability  makes the effective  marginal
price of E lower [see (lOb)]  and raises the amount of E consumed.  This means that to produce
the same output the firm moves to a higher isoquant  between e and eN  because the non-power
inputs L and M are lowered. Hence, EA  is raised and so is (l-ir)Ei as iri  is lowered. In Figure
2, this is shown  by the movement  from A to B'. So when firm-specific  factors  which contribute
to the unreliability  experienced  by a firm are reduced, that firm buys more public sector power
and, through congestion,  contributes to higher unreliability  for other firms. An unambiguous
reduction in unreliability  takes place for all firms when the aggregate  demand for public sector
power is reduced either by a change  in the tariff or by an indirect means such  as subsidizing  the
cost of private power generation.- 16 -
IV.  SIMULATING  TARIFF POLICY FOR NIGERIA
In order to perform simulations  with the above models  of the firms' behavior, we have
to first do two preparatory tasks. One is to calibrate the firm's production function using data
from the survey  of Nigerian  manufacturers.  The second  task is to decide  on an appropriate  price
setting  behavior on the part of NEPA.
A.  Calibration  Procedure
As explained in  the  earlier section, the  degree of  scale economies in  producing
endogenous  power were assumed  to be the same for each firm and the coefficient  a  = 0.55407
was estimated  from a Cobb-Douglas  specification  of the embedded  cost function.  Then, the scale
factor G, was set for each firm in such a way that the firm's reported cost of endogenous
electricity  generation was replicated.
Following this,  the essential substitutes model was calibrated as  follows. aij,  the
exponent of labor in the ith firm's production function, was set as aLu  =  sLJsy, where sL,  is
labor's  share in  the firm's  total production cost and sy =  0.88172 is the degree of scale
economies in primary production estimated from a  Cobb-Douglas  specification  of  the cost
function. Once aL4  was thus calibrated,  equations (7a)-(7c)  were used with the observed prices
and input levels to calculate am, a.  and aNi,  the remaining  exponents  in the firm's production
function.  Then, using the observed  output  and input  levels and the calibrated  exponents,  the scale- 17 -
parameter  of the production  function  A,  was calculated.  Similarly,  the production  function  of the
strict complements  model  was also calibrated  using an analogous  procedure,  in this case working
with (9b) and (10a), (lOb) and obtaining  auj,  am;  and aEi  and the scale parameter A;.
B.  NPA's  Behavigr
NEPA offers quantity  discounts  which are a form of price discrimination.  The prices
charged to specific  firms  vary around the estimated  tariff. Some  such variation is obviously  due
to measurement  errors, but a part of the variation  is due to the fact  that prices charged by NEPA
vary considerably  by industry  and location  within Nigeria.
In 1988, when our data was collected, NEPA was believed to be covering  only about
21.9% of its operating  cost. This is surmised  from World Bank studies of NEPA [Report No.
111672-UNI,  July 1993].5  In  1988 the average tariff charged by NEPA was 0.07 naira/KWh
which was much below average operating cost. By mid-1989  the average tariff was raised to
0.32 naira/KWh  which covered NEPA's operating  cost. Hence, assuming  that conditions  were
roughly unchanged  between 1988 and mid-1989,  only 21.9% of NEPA's operating cost was
covered  in 1989. Further scrutiny  of the data shows  that the cost recovery  ratio was much  higher
from power sold to residential  users than it was from power sold to manufacturers.  Estimates
by NEPA management  in 1990  indicate  that 73.33% of the power sale revenues  were from non-
manufacturers (residential and  commercial users)  with  the  remaining  26.67%  from
See page 5 of World Bank Report No. 11672-UNI.- 18 -
manufacturers.6
Assuming  that the sources of the revenues were not changed in the 1988-1990  period,
the following  equation  relates the cost-recovery  ratios applied to the two sectors in 1988:
(13a)  x, (0.267) + x2 (0.733) = 0.219,
where  xi  and  x2 are  the  cost  recovery ratios of  manufacturing and  non-manufacturing
respectively. If one of these ratios can be estimated, then the other can be calculated  from the
above  equation.  We estimate  xl from our sampled  manufacturers  and then use the above equation
to calculate  x2.
The 160 firms in our sample  bought 837,148,000  KWh of power from NEPA in 1987
and collectively  paid 15,845,000  naira to NEPA. At an average  cost of 0.32 naira per KWh, the
power  delivered  to these firms cost 267,887,360  naira to produce. Dividing  payments  to NEPA
by the cost we get x, = 0.059. Hence,  only 5.9% of the cost of serving these manufacturers  was
recovered  by NEPA. From tne above equation,  x 2 =  0.277, which means that NEPA recovered
27.7% of the cost of serving the nonmanufacturing  users. Together, the two sectors recovered
21.9% of NEPA's operating cost. Hence, the nonmanufacturing  sector's cost recovery  rate in
1988 was 4.695 times that of the manufacturing  sector.
In performing  simulations,  we will experiment  with alternative  tariffs while  keeping  the
relative  cost recovery  ratios (or the rates of c.-oss-subsidization)  at 1988  conditions.  We will also
simulate mid-1989  conditions  when NEPA achieved  full cost recovery, with the average tariff
raised to 0.32 naira/KWh, by assuming  that the relative cost recovery ratios remained  at 1988
levels. For mid-1989, the above equation  will be written by setting  the right side equal to one
6 See page 85 of World Bank Report No.  11672-UNI.- 19  -
(full cost recovery) and setting x21x 1 =  4.695. Then, letting y be the cost recovery ratio for
manufacturing,  we solve y from:
(13b)  y (0.267) +  (x2/x,) y (0.733) =  1.00,
and find y = 0.269. Hence, as NEPA moved  towards  operating  cost recovery  in mid-1989,  the
cost recovered from the manufacturing  sector would  have risen from 5.9% to 26.9% while that
recovered from the nonmanufacturing  sector would have risen from 27.7% to 130% assuming
no  change in  the relative rate of  cross-subsidization  of  the  manufacturing sector by  the
nonmanufacturing  sector.
Our purpose is to test the effects of alternative  tariffs on the manufacturing  sector by
simulating  the factor choices  of each of the firms  in our sample,  while keeping  constant  NEPA's
cost recovery  ratio for manufacturing.  Alternative  tariffs will be simulated  by changing  the value
of 0 which determines the rate of quantity discount in Equation 3a and by calculating the
constant B for each value of ,B, such that the cost recovery ratio is at the given level. Thus,
denoting the cost-recovery  ratio by p,  the value of B (given 0) must satisfy the following
equation:
(14)  Ei B bi ejN =  k (Ej  eN)  p,
where the left side is total NEPA revenue by summation  of the total tariffs charged to the n
firms (from Equation 3a) and the right side is the cost-recovery  ratio times total NEPA cost,
calculated  as average  cost per KWh (k) times the total number  of KWh of power sold by NEPA
to the n firms.7 Of course, the values of eN;  are found by solving each firm's cost minimizing
response in light of the new tariff characterized  by a given value of 0 and the calculated  value
of B. When 0 <  1 the NEPA tariff embodies  a quantity  discount  and when ,  >  1 it embodies
7' The average tariff per KWh, k, was 0.32 nairm  (32 kobos) in the period 1988, 1989.- 20 -
a an increasing  block structure. For 1988 conditions,  we will set the cost recovery ratio p
0.059 and for mid-1989  we will set it at p = 0.269.
In  Figure  3,  two tariffs, one decreasing-block  and the  other increasing-block are
juxtaposed. The decreasing-block  tariff is the curve OA (with  ,B <  1) and the increasing-block
tariff the curve OB (with ,B >  1). Suppose that the tariff is changed from OA to OB. Now
consider the point N which is a quantity  purchased from NEPA such that the marginal tariff
before and after the change  is the same. All firms which initially  purchased  power less than N
will now be facing lower marginal  costs and will increase  their use of NEPA power, while the
firms originally purchasing  more than N units are now facing higher marginal costs and will
decrease their use of NEPA power. It is easily seen from this that the increasing  block tariff
encourages  small users to buy more NEPA power while inducing  larger users to buy less. If the
reduced purchases  of the latter more than  offset the increased  purchases of the former, NEPA's
operating costs will be reduced. Moreover, total payments  to NIPA will also be reduced for
many firms. For example, the firm originally buying OC units will face lower total NEPA
payments  as long as the changed  tariff does not induce it to consume more than OC' units. We
will return to Figure 3 when we interpret the results of our simulations.
C.  Measurement  of Benefits
Now let us consider how the economic  benefits of a given tariff should be calculated
in the present context. First note that firms are minimizing  costs. Hence, output levels and
output prices are considered  unchanged  for each firm. This is clearly somewhat  unsatisfactory,
but there is no way around it since we do not have any knowledge of the market demand
functions  for the goods  in question  and, therefore, we cannot simulate  how output prices would- 21  -
change in response  to changes in marginal costs generated  by the changed tariffs. Because of
this, we are forced to pose our welfare calculations  in a cost minimizing  context. Benefits to
firms will be measured  by the reduction in their total payments to the factors of production
needed  to produce  the given amount  of output. Hence, the benefit  level will be measured  by the
sum of their labor, materials,  embedded  electricity  and NEPA costs. Benefits to NEPA will be
measured  by the decrease  in NEPA's losses (NEPA's production  cost less NEPA's revenues).
Total economic  benefits are the sum of the benefits  to the firms less losses by NEPA. Note that
payments to NEPA appear as costs borne by the firms, on the one hand, and as payments
received by NEPA on the other, cancelling  from the total benefit calculation.  Because of this,
the total benefit measure is written as the sum of all costs of production  including the cost of
producing  the power supplied  by NEPA:
TC = ;  [PL  L; + PM;  M; + c(wj,e;)  +  k e,J.
Improvem.ents  in benefits  are equivalent  to reductions  in TC.
Consider  also, how a tariff change  for manufacturing  will affect the non-manufacturing
sector. Suppose  that the effect  of the tariff is to decrease total NEPA production.  Since the cost
recovery ratio  of  the  manufacturing sector  is  being kept  constant and  since  the  non-
manufacturing sector is  cubsidizing the  manufacturing sector, the  tariff charged to  non-
manufacturing  users can be decreased. Such a decrease is a cost saving and a benefit to non-
manufacturing  users but this is exactly  offset  by the lower payments  NEPA collects  from these
users. Non-manufacturing  users could increase  their demands  for NEPA electricity  following  the
lowering  in NEPA's tariff to them. However,  it is reasonable  to assume that non-manufacturing
demands for NEPA electricity  are inelastic.  With all these assumptions,  total costs in the non-
manufacturing  sector, as defined above, will be the appropriate measure of welfare, but those
costs will remain unchanged.-22  -
Using the values observed in 1988, the 160 firms in our sample accounted for a total
cost level (TC) of  1,693,515,650  naira of which 79.4% (or 1,344,588,875 naira) comprised
expenditures  on labor and materials  inputs, another 15.8% (or 267,887,360  naira) was the cost
of public  electricity  produced  by NEPA  and the remaining  4.8  % (81,039,415  naira) was the cost
of privately produced  electricity. Payments  to NEPA were 15,845,000  naira or about 20% of
the aggregate  cost of internally  generated  power.
D.  Simulations  with the Essential-Substitutes  Model
Table 1 shows  the results  of the search for the optimal  tariff under 1988 conditions,  with
the cost-recovery  ratio for manufacturing  at 5.9% (p=0.059). Each row of the table calculates
the value of the tariff "level- parameter B given the tariff urateu parameter ,.  Changes and
benefits are calculated  relative  to the observed  tariff with B = 0.5667823  and ,  0.67714. As
the tariff exponent  P is increased  toward  one, quantity  discounts  get weaker  and as it passes one
increasing  block tariffs are offered.
At first, total benefits increase sharply as the value of 0 deviates from the observed
value. For example, increasing  B  from 0.8 to 1.8 raises the percentage  increase  in total benefits
from 2.83% to 10.00%. Subsequently,  the rate of increase  becomes  more gradual. The biggest
percentage  decrease  in the firms' operating  costs is about 0.94% and is observed for ,  between
1.2 and 1.4. Embedded  costs decrease by as much as 0.62% when ,=1.2  and then increase
gradually  thereafter.  Between  0 =  13.8  and ,  =  18.8, the benefits  are virtually unchanged.  The
optimum is approximately  at 0 =  15.2. The overwhelming  part of the gain in benefits comes
from a reduction in NEPA's costs. Because  of the increasing  block nature of the tariff, firms
reduce their NEPA purchases by 95% on the average. At the optimal 0 value, embedded  costs- 23  -
increase  by 1.49% and firms' total operating costs by 0.87% but the decrease in NEPA costs
more than offsets the increase in private costs resulting  in a 13.43% increase  in total benefits.
Table 2 presents  the responses  of a subsample  of selected  individual  firms from the full
sample of  160 manufacturers  when ,B  is at its optimal value of 15.2. The table includes the
responses of the five smallest  and five largest NEPA users (by annual 1000 KWhs)  and every
tenth firm from the fifth smallest  to the fifth largest user of NEPA. Referring to Figure 3, the
quantity  N is at about  250,000 KWh  per year. There are 78 firms  which initially  consumed  more
than N units of power and these firms reduce their power consumption  because they face a
higher marginal  price after the tariff change.'  Reductions  of NEPA power increase gradually
from 1.2% for the smallest  of these 78 largest firms to 99.9% for the very largest. The 82
smallest firms, on the other hand, face lowered marginal prices and increase their NEPA
purchases  by 4097% for the smallest  firm to 0.7% for the largest  such firm. The total operating
cost of firms consuming  more than a million  KWhs of NEPA power increases  while all smaller
firms experience some reduction in their operating costs (Table 3).  However, savings in
operating cost are relatively small percentages  because the firms have to compensate  for the
large changes  in NEPA power  by making  adjustments  in their other inputs.  Because  of the Cobb-
Douglas nature of the technology,  labor, material and embedded  electricity expenditures  are
changed  by the same  percentage  amount for each firm. As explained  earlier, the bulk of the total
benefits are due to less power production  and, hence, lower costs by NEPA.
A second simulation  was done to evaluate the effects of the actual tariff change  which
occurred  in mid-1989.  As explained  earlier the tariff  change  was such  that NEPA's average  tariff
per KWh was raised from 7 kobos in 1988 to 32 kobos in mid-1989  to roughly cover NEPA's
Twelve  of these  seventy  eight firms  appear  in Table  2.- 24 -
operating  cost. As we saw earlier, this change implied  an increase  in the cost-recovery  ratio of
manufacturing  from 5.9% to 27%. Keeping  the value i  at its observed  level, we simulated  the
effects of imposing  the higher cost-recovery  ratio and calculated  B accordingly.  The marginal
price of NEPA power increased  by about 340% for each firm in our sample. To this the firms
reacted as expected  by substituting  embedded  power and other inputs for NEPA power. Each
firm reduced its purchases from NEPA by about 76%-78% and increased its embedded  power
by various  percentages  ranging  up to 30%. Total  intemally  generated  power  increased  by 0.69%
and total expenditures  on labor and materials  increased  by about 1.4  %. The total cost of intemal
electricity generation  increased  by 1.08% and total operating cost increased by 1.13%. NEPA
revenue from manufacturing  and NEPA's cost of serving manufacturers  increased  by 3.95%.
The next step is to use the above simulation  as the new base on which to find the
optimal  tariff under  mid-1989  conditions.  These results  are shown  in Table 3, which  again varies
the value of # finding  B in each case so that the cost-recovery  ratio is now 27%. The optimal
tariff is around ,B =  2.6. Total benefits  increase  by 1.65%. Although  an increasing  block tariff
does  result in improvement  under the mid-1989  conditions,  the percentage  improvement  is about
an eighth of that which occurs under the 1988 conditions. However, the optimal tariff still
requires raising the marginal costs of the larger NEPA users and lowering the costs of the
smaller users. NEPA saves 44,793,960 naira in production cost, NEPA revenues are reduced
by 11,489,850  naira and the firms' operating  costs are increased  by 8,119,000 naira. Under the
optimal  tariff, the largest  thirteen  NEPA users experience  higher marginal  costs and reduce  their
NEPA purchases  from 9% to 98.5%. The responses  of the five largest  users is included  in Table
4.- 25 -
E.  Simulations  with the Strict-Complements  Model
In the strict compiements  case we report the results of three simulations  which parallel
those discussed  above. Under each altemative  tariff, the degree of unreliability, s, is assumed
to remain fixed at its observed value for each firm. This means that firms will respond to a
higher marginal NEPA price by reducing  both NEPA and internally generated power by the
same percentage  amount and increasing  all other inputs by the some other percentage  amount.
This is easily seen from Figure 2 where the firm is constrained  to operate on the same rate of
boosting, i.e. on a fixed ray through  the origin with given slope bi.
As shown in Table 5,  improvements  over the  1988 actual tariff are maximized by
offering a steeply  rising  tariff. The optimal  values of B  is 7.8. With this tariff, total benefits  are
increased by 12.96%. Embedded  production costs are 4.56% lower and operating costs are
0.29% higher. NEPA's production  costs are 88.7% lower. From Table 6,  we can see that the
largest firms decrease  their use of power. There are actually 13 such firms, which face a higher
marginal  price than they did before the tariff change. These firms  reduce their power usages  by
various percentages  ranging  from 3.4% for the smallest  to 99.4% for the largest. The responses
of the largest five are included  in Table 6. The smallest  firms, on the other hand, increase  their
consumption  of power  because NEPA tariffs for small users are drastically  reduced.  Tariffs fall
virtually to zero for firns using up to about 750,000 KWh of power annually.
The next simulation  imposes  the cost recovering  tariff which  took place  in mid-1989.  The
general rise in tariffs results in a 53% reduction in NEPA's cost of production and a 22%
reduction in embedded power production costs. Operating costs of production increase by
2.63%. Table 7 shows the search for the optimal tariff in the mid-1989  conditions.  The value- 26 -
of ,  is 2.4. The benefit level increases by 4.05%. NEPA's costs are 79.6% lower, embedded
costs 9.88% lower and operating  costs 0.77% higher. The responses  of the subsample  of firms
is shown in Table 8.
The  next set  of  simulations with  the  strict complements model treats congestion
endogenously.  Therefore, the equilibrium  degrees  of reliability, -r;, facing  each firm satisfy the
equation  system  given by (12). One unknown  piece  of information  is the degree to which r1will
respond to changes in the aggregate demand for NEPA power, D. We assumed that a one
percent decrease in aggregate  demand for NEPA power will result in a one percent reduction
in vi. The value of 4 in (12) was calibrated so that the weighted average elasticity  of v; with
respect to D was 0.01.
The simulations  for this case also parallel the previous  ones. From Table 9, the optimal
1988 tariff has B =  17.5. The benefit level is improved by  14.49%, NEPA's costs fall by
86.34%, embedded  costs fall by 61.32% and operating  costs by 1.93%. From Table 10 we can
see that all firms which increase  their total power use, increase  their purchases from NEPA by
a bigger percentage than they increase their own production. Many firms even decrease their
own production. As shown in Figure 4, both patterns are consistent  with an improvement  in
reliability. In Figure 4a, the substitution  effect  of the reliability  improvement  dominates  over the
output effect. In Figure 4b, the output effect dominates.  However, because in our simulations
the output level is fixed, a reduction  in the use of the other inputs (labor and materials)  in favor
of electricity  is required to produce  the constant  level of output under higher reliability  in public
electricity supply.
Because  reliability  is improving,  there are firms which  increase  their use of NEPA power
even as the marginal price of NEPA power offered to them increases. As we saw earlier,
keeping reliability constant, a firm which faces a higher marginal price would want to reduce- 27 -
its use of both kinds of power. However, because reliability  is improved, the firm will want to
use more NEPA power. This substitution  effect of the reliability  improvement  can more than
offset the substitution  effect of the price increase.
The largest firms decrease  their consumption  of both kinds of power, but decrease their
internally  generated  power by a larger percentage.
In the second simulation, the actual mid-1989  tariff improves reliability because the
increase in the tariff results in a 42.27% reduction  in the aggregate  demand for NEPA power.
Firms' own electricity  generation  drops by 67.2% and their embedded  cost by 36%. Operating
cost increases  by 2.33  %. Under mid-1989  conditions,  the optimal  ,  =  3.5. As seen from Table
II,  this results in a 7.32  % improvement  in the level of benefits.  Operating  costs drop by almost
2%, embedded  cost by almost  60% and NEPA  cost by 75.5%. The firms' responses  are shown
in Table 12.
A final set of simulations  with endogenous  reliability  was also performed by assuming
that the elasticity  of the degree of unreliability  with respect to the aggregate  NEPA use was 2%
or twice as high as in the set of simulations  discussed  above. Detailed  results for this last set of
simulations  are not presented. But Table 13 which summarizes  the aggregate  results of all the
simulations includes this last case as well. It is seen from that table that the benefits of an
optimized  tariff are higher when the degree of congestion  in the supply of public electricity  is
higher.- 28 -
V.  SIMULATING  TARIFF POLICY FOR INDONESIA
Our survey sample  in Indonesia  was conducted  in 1992, five years later than in Nigeria.
A total of 279 firms remained  after routine data cleaning  and of these only 171 reported using
both power sources. Virtually all of the remaining firms relied entirely on PLN. This is an
important difference from Nigeria where, as mentioned  earlier, 87% of the firms used both
power sources. In addition, the Indonesian sample includes a broader representation  of the
smallest firms whereas the Nigerian sample is strongly biased towards larger firms. In the
Indonesian  sample many firms which used both sources  of power used small quantities  of their
own power. This is in part a reflection  of the fact that the public  power source is more reliable
in Indonesia than it is Nigeria and that some of the sampled firms had, perhaps, virtually
abandoned  use of their generators  by 1992, but it may  also be due to the bias that smaller users
appeared more frequently  in the Indonesian  sample.
Since we are simulating  tariff policy we ought to consider, in principle, the potential
response  of exclusive  PLN users when PLN's tariff is changed.  More specifically,  if some  firms
are charged a sufficiently  higher marginal  price for PLN power they might consider installing
their own generators and using their own  power at least part of the time. At the other extreme,
firms for which PLN power is made sufficiently  cheaper  could greatly increase  purchases from
PLN. These two types of responses are important components  of how the entire Indonesian
population of firms would respond to  PLN tariff changes. It is difficult to include in the
simulations  the behavior  of the exclusive  PLN users. The main reason for this is that we do not
know what kind of embedded  power technology  such firms might install (if at all) and we also- 29 -
do not know at what  boosting rate" they are likely to  operate.9  Also, in  the simulations
reported here we did not  consider the  responses of  those firms which did not have any
generators in place and those which either purchased less than 5,000 KWh from PLN or
produced  less than 1,000 KWh from their own generators. There were 35 such firms in the
sample.  Removing  them reduced  the Indonesian  simulation  sample  to 136  firms. This makes our
simulation  sample more comparable  to the Nigerian one.
The Indonesian  data on energy  sales by PLN show a rapidly increasing  trend in the late
eighties  (of about 16% per annum)  with slightly lower projections  into the 1990s  of about (13-
15% per annum) [World Bank Report, February 1989]. Because of the rapid growth of the
Indonesian  economy, it was deemed  important  to use figures which would be accurate for the
survey year 1992. However,  in the absence  of actual figures for that year, we had to rely on the
projections  made in the'late eighties.  Based  on these  projections,  PLN produced  and sold 38,850
GWh of power in 1992/93. This would have cost 3,851 billion rupiyah giving a unit cost (or
average  tariff) of .99.12  rupiyah/Kwh.  Projected  PLN revenues  would have been 5,386 billion
rupiyah, giving a cost recovery rate of 1.398 times the operating  cost.'0
The 136  firms in our sample  bought  78,404,000  KWh of power from PLN in 1992  and
collectively  paid 11,373,340  rupiyah to PLN. At an average cost of 99.12 rupiyah per KWh,
the power delivered to these firms cost 7,771,404 rupiyah to produce. Dividing payments to
PLN  by  the  cost  we get  x,  =  1.456. Hence,  145.6%% of  the  cost of  serving these
manufacturers  was recovered by PLN. According to projections, manufacturing  in  1992/93
9 Similarly, the eossntial substitutes model can only be estimated with a sample of firms each of which is using both
power sources.
10 While in Nigeria, NEPA barely covered operating cost in mid-1989, in Indonesia PLN more than covered operating
cost because of the need to pay for capital expansion in a rapidly growing economy. By contrast, in Nigeria there was
comparatively little capital expansion or the central government subsidized such expansion rather than requiring NEPA
to pay for it.- 30 -
would have accounted  for 50.6% of power use. Hence, equation  (13a) can be used to calculate
that the implied cost recovery  rate for nonmanufacturing  customers  would have been 133.8%.
Hence, the nonmanufacturing  and manufacturing  sectors' cost recovery  rates in 1992  were close
with relatively  little cross-subsidization,  while  in Nigeria nonmanufacturing  cross-subsidized  the
manufacturing  sector.
Table 14 compares the cost shares of inputs in the Indonesian sample  with those in the
Nigerian sample. Both social cost shares and  operating cost  shares are  compared. It  is
noteworthy  that in the Indonesian  sample, the share of electricity  in social cost is only 3.65%
whereas in Nigerian sample it is 20.6%. In Indonesia  the cost share of electricity in private
operating cost is very close to its share in social cost, but in Nigeria the private cost share of
electricity is about a third of the social cost share of electricity.  Total payments for public
power in Nigeria  are about 20% of the total cost of privately  generated  power. In Indonesia,  the
equivalent  percentage  is 65  %. In terms of private operating  cost, the Nigerian  firms spend five
times more on private power than on public power, but Indonesian  firms spend only 1.5 times
more. The differences  between  the two countries  are driven in part by the absence of very large
electricity  users in the Indonesian  sample.
The Indonesian  simulations  parallel those for Nigeria based on the strict complements
model. First, in Table 15, the optimal tariff is found when the degree of unreliability  (or the
boosting  rate, x) is insensitive  to the aggregate  demand  for PLN power. In this case, as the table
shows, the optimal value of P is 0.95 which is slightly higher than the actual value of 0.909.
Hence, it may  be said that the actual tariff is nearly  optimal. Furthermore, Table 15 also shows
that the total benefit changes  by a mere 0.01 percent when the tariff is adjusted from the actual- 31 -
0.909 to the optimal 0.95.  Table 16 displays the responses of  selected individual firms."
Marginal price changes induced by optimizing  the tariff are small compared to Nigeria  the
smallest  firms experience  a decrease  in their marginal  tariffs of around 15  % and the largest users
of about 11  %. Since unreliability  is exogenous  and fixed, both kinds of power are increased  or
decreased  by the same percentage: the smallest  firms increase  their power  use while the biggest
ones decrease  it. Total power use is decreased  by 3.91%.
Next, as was done in the case of Nigeria, we resimulated  the firms' responses and
recalculated the optimal tariff udder the assumption that the degree of unreliability  (X) was
endogencus  and that the elasticity  of Xr  to aggregate  demand  for PLN power  was 1  %. As shown
in Table 17, the optimal tariff has a ,  =  1.05 (a very slightly increasing  block structure  and
very close to the actual tariff of 0.909) and total cost saving is merely 0.03%. Aggregate
purchases from PLN decline  by 10.71% and internal production of electricity  by 5.93%. The
aggregate cost of embedded  production drops by  3.72% and total operating cost drops by
0.085%.  Table 18 shows  the responses  of the selected  firms. Smaller firms increase  purchases
from PLN and produce more power internally,  but because reliability  is improved, the percent
increase in PLN power  purchased  is bigger as firms operate on lower rates of boosting. As firm
size gets larger some firms begin to even decrease their own power production, and for the
largest firms both power sources are used less but there is a bigger percentage cutback  in the
private power  source. Of course, this pattern  is induced  by the big percentage  decrease  (as much
as 45%) in the marginal  PLN tariff offered to smaller firms and the big percentage increase  (as
much as 51 %) offered to larger firms. Although,  the change  in tariff from the actual tariff with
=  0.909 to the optimal  one with ,  =  1.05 appears  rather slight, firms respond, as in the case
As in the Nigeria tables, we selected the five smallest  users of PLN, the five biggest users and every other tenth firm
after  the fifth smallest user.- 32 -
of Nigeria, with substantial  individual changes and in a similar way although the degree of
response is not as strong as those for Nigeria which were documented  in  Table 10.  It is
noteworthy  that although  there are big drops in individual  boosting  rates for many firms, on the
average the degree of unreliability  (see Equation 12) falls by only 4.12% from 25.51% to
24.46%, not as big an improvement  as that observed  in Nigeria. Tables 19 and 20 document  the
optimal tariff and firms' responses  when the elasticity of unreliability  to the aggregate PLN
demand is  2%.  As expected and as  we also  saw in  the Nigerian case,  the response is
qualitatively  similar to the pattem of Table 18 but more pronounced.  The average degree of
unreliability  falls by 9.4% to 23.11 percent.- 33 -
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  AND CAVEATS  ON SIMULATION  RESULTS
At the qualitative level our results for Nigeria demonstrate that in the presence of
unreliable  power supply  by the public utility and partial cost recovery, the constrained-optimal
tariff is one which penalizes  power use by large customers  in favor of subsidizing  power use by
small ones. This finding  was borne out regardless  of the assumptions  used to model  the firm's
production technology  and regardless  of whether  the degree of unreliability  faced by the firms
was exogenously  or endogenously  determined. In all cases examined, the optimal tariff is a
major departure from the quantity  discounts  actually offered by NEPA.
It should  be kept in mind, of course, that the tariffs calculated  in this study are optimal
only in a short run sense. It was assumed that the unreliability  of delivered  power cannot be
directly improved  by the public sector. The costs of such improvement  in Nigeria are assumed
to be very high for the short run. It was also assumed, in the case of 1988 conditions,  that full
cost-recovery  was not possible  for NEPA.
In most cases, as is readily seen from the even-numbered  tables for Nigeria, the optimal
tariff has a steeply  rising increasing  block nature:  marginal quantities  of power are offered at
virtually no cost per KWh to the smallest  customers  and at a very high cost per KWh to the
largest customers.  Therefore, it may be concluded  that the optimal  pricing policy  in Nigeria can
be approximated  by a rationing  scheme which disconnects  the largest industrial customers  and
offers power  a very low price to the smallest  customers. Such  a policy would  be consistent  with
the large investment  of private generators  available  to the largest customers  and with the social
need to stimulate  investment  and job formation  in the small manufacturers  sector.
At a more detailed level, our chief findings  for Nigeria which need highlighting  are as- 34 -
follows. First, the improvement  in total cost experienced  by the firms in our sample was quite
robust under the 1988 conditions.  Regardless of the technology  and congestion assumptions,
benefits ranged from 12.96% to  15.36% reductions in cost. Second, under the mid-1989
conditions which recovered NEPA costs, benefits were lower in every case but varied more
ranging from 1.65% to 9.04% savings in cost. Third, significant  reductions in operating cost
were observed when the degree of unreliability  was made endogenous.  In this case, the private
sector's aggregate operating  costs of production fell by almost 2% to almost 3.5% depending
on the elasticity  of unreliability  with respect to aggregate  NEPA  purchases.  This may  not appear
as a large percentage  decrease  if it is not placed in perspective.  Firms in our sample spent  just
over twenty percent of their operating cost on the internal generation of electricity and on
purchases from NEPA. So a reduction in operating costs of 2-4% is actually a considerable
saving  as a proportion  of the firms' aggregate  energy bill. More significantly,  individual  firms
in our sample  were affected differentially.
Consider, for  example, Tables  10 and  12 which show that when unreliability is
endogenous some individual firms reduced their operating costs by as much as 37%. Cost
savings in the order of  10%-15% were not uncommon. In most cases, these savings were
realized by those firms which were sold NEPA power more  cheaply  after the tariff change. The
largest firms, on the other hand experienced  increases  as high as 20% in their operating costs.
It is efficient that such cost increases  be borne by the largest firms in order to induce them to
use their private generators more efficiently  and to get them to contribute to a lower level of
congestion. In this sense, the higher cost serves as a proxy for a 'congestion toll". An analogy
may be made with the optimal  use of congestion  tolls  in road-pricing.  Trucks (analogous  to large
firms in our case) contribute much more significantly  to road wear and tear and to traffic
congestion than do cars (analogous  to small firms in our case). Efficient road pricing would- 35 -
require a higher congestion  toll per axle-weight  on trucks than on cars, because diverting one
truckload  to an alternate  mode, say railroads  (analogous  to private provision  in our case), would
save society  more than diverting one car trip.
Our results also indicate that one effect of the optimized  tariff structure is to induce
firms to use other inputs in place  of their own and NEPA's power. This is perhaps  more readily
seen from the results of the essential  substitutes  model as summarized  in Table 13. In this case
the aggregate operating cost of firms increases by less than one percent and embedded  cost
increases  by more  than one percent.  Therefore,  it is NEPA's cost reduction  and any cost-savings
from the use of other inputs which are chiefly responsible for the total cost savings which
exceeded 10%. In fact, this pattern is seen to hold for the small firms as seen from Table 2.
They are induced, by the lower marginal tariff charged to them, to greatly increase their
consumption  of NEPA power  and cut back on the cost of other inputs, achieving  a lower  overall
operating cost. The pattern is similar to that seen in Table 10 when unreliability  is endogenous.
In this case, as well, the lower marginal  tariff induces small firms to reduce their own power
use in favor of purchases from NEPA and to substitute  away from other inputs.
Several caveats are in order for the further interpretation  of our quantitative  results for
Nigeria. Perhaps the most important  of these concerns the use of a Cobb-Douglas  functional
form to represent the firms' technologies.  Although  this form was selected for its convenience
in calibration  and computation,  it is not a sufficiently  flexible functional  form.  Our calibration
approach  assures that each firm has its own Cobb-Douglas  technology,  but flexible  substitution
patterns are ruled out for each firm.
A second caveat concerns the fact that our sample of firms in Nigeria may not be
representative. While  this limitation  does not affect  our analysis  of how  individual  firms respond
to tariff changes, it would affect the accuracy of our aggregate  calculations  and our ability to- 36 -
project the aggregate results to the national industrial sector in Nigeria. The report in  the
references  states (World  Bank, 1993, page 92) that a total of 2,121 GWh of electricity  was sold
to manufacturers  in 1988. This amounted to 29% of NEPA's total sales in that year and the
percentage has remained roughly constant over time. NEPA purchases by the firms in our
sample  amounted  to 837 GWh or 39.5% of the total sold to industries  in 1988. Our finns are
160 in number or 12.4% % of the total number of 1,294 manufacturers  in the five Nigerian
cities included  in the study. The largest firm in our sample  was responsible  for the purchase of
662.72 GWh of power from NEPA. This is 79% of the total power use by the 160 finns in our
sample. Clearly, this largest  firm is an unusually  power intensive  unit. However, even exclusion
of this firm from our sample  leaves a total consumption  of 175 GWh of NEPA power by the
remaining  159  firms which  is still 8.2% of the total sold by NEPA in 1988. Nevertheless,  a few
rough calculations  can be made to provide an upper bound for aggregate  savings.
Consider, for example, that under 1988 conditions the optimal tariff with endogenous
reliability  (Table  9) would  have  resulted  in a total cost saving  of 245.4 million  naira by the firms
included  in our sample. As a crude guess, if aggregate  gains are ten times this number (based
on  12.4% sample), then the aggregate benefit for the five cities is about 2.5 billion naira
annually. However, we cannot overemphasize  the fact that this is a very rough projection. A
more meaningful  way to evaluate the significance  of the estimated  cost saving is to consider it
as an annual return on the present value of investments  in privately owned generators. As
reported in  Lee  and Anas (1992a), the  manufacturers in  our sample had investments in
generators worth 169.1 million  naira and spent  26.4 million  naira annually on the maintenance
and operation of these generators. At a 10% rate of discount, the present value of investment
and annual operating  outlays  was 393.7 million  naira. Under 1988 conditions,  the 245.4 million
naira in savings  is a 62  % annual  return on this private investment  in generating  capacity.  Under- 37 -
mid-1989  conditions  the annual  cost saving  induced  by the optimal  tariff was 113.7 million  naira
(see  Table 11)  which  amounts  to 29% annual  return on private  investments  in power  generation.
Our conclusions  for Indonesia  are qualitatively  similar,  but the benefits  produced  by tariff
optimization  are much smaller than in Nigeria. The reason for this is that there are relatively
fewer very large users public  power in the Indonesian  sample. If this is the result of sampling
error, then the inclusion  of even  larger PLN customers  would  bring the Indonesian  results closer
in line with those for Nigeria. We conducted  a reverse test of this by rerunning some of the
Nigerian simulations  after removing  the one largest user.  of power (firm number 32) from the
sample. After doing this, the quantitative  Nigerian  results gravitated  considerably  towards the
Indonesian  results. The intuition  is straightforward  and is best seen by considering  the highway
analogy: if there are very few large trucks on the road, then it is obvious that there would  be
fewer benefits from using tolls to divert truck shipments  to the rail mode.
Despite the above caveats and data limitations, we believe that our results have
demonstrated  a basic fallacy  of using quantity  discounts  to price unreliable  public infrastructure
services  in developing  countries  in the presence  of competing  private infrastructure  provision  by
firms. In this situation, public sector pricing policy should consider the full social cost of
infrastructure  provision. This requires taking into account  the productive  capacity installed in
the private sector and the fact that strained  public supply  networks  are unreliable. Therefore,  an
optimal  pricing policy  should  in part aim to reduce  demands  for the public  source and shift such
demands  to the private sector. As a result, the private self provision  capacity will be more fully
utilized, while also tht degree of unreliability  on the public supply  network will be reduced.- 38 -
VII.  INCREASING  SUPPLY  CAPACITY  BY PRIVATE SECTOR
PARTICIPATION:  FtYTJRI POLICY DIRECTION
The quality of infrastructure services delivered by  the public sector in  Nigeria are
inadequate for the needs of most manufacturers.  Deficiencies  are observed in the delivery of
electricity, water, telephone  service, transportation  of goods and people and waste disposal. All
of these deficiencies  impose significant  costs on manufacturers  which affects the quality and
quantity  of their production.  The highest  costs are incurred in relation  to electric power  because
this input is essential in  virtually all manufacturing  operations and because it is costly for
manufacturers  to compensate  for the nonperformance  of the public power sector.
The nonperformance  of the public sector is not due to the lack of adequate generating
capacity.  To the contrary, the country  is not fully utilizing  its installed  public  power generating
capacity.  Rather bottlenecks  occur in the transmission  and delivery  of power. Recurring  failures
take the form of voltage fluctuations  and power interruptions. These problems are due to
operational  difficulties  in the management  of the transmission  and distribution  of electricity.  The
personnel and officials who are responsible for these operations are poorly paid and poorly
trained.  As well, there are problems  with the availability  and delivery of spare parts. In the
presence of  these operational problems, the transmission bottlenecks cause power failures
because of the high loads placed on the system.
To compensate for the nonperformance  of the public sector in  the transmission and
distribution of  electricity, manufacturers have installed their own private in-plant power- 39 -
generation  systems. These are used in a variety of ways to offset as much as possible the costs
of interruptions  and voltage fluctuations  in the electricity  supplied  by NEPA. In 1988, 89 % of
the firms had some degree of reliance on their own power generators despite the much higher
cost (for most firms) of generating  power internally.
We have identified  essentially four broad ways in which firms make use of the power
delivered  by NEPA. Self sufficient  firms have enough scale and power is sufficiently  important
to their operations  that they  can afford to provide  their own power  virtually  all of the time. Such
firms are essentially  immune  to the nonperformance  in the public sector. Most firms, however,
cannot  afford to be self sufficient. Some firms  prefer to use their own  power consistently  during
those periods in the day when NEPA power is most likely to be unreliable and to use NEPA
power  at other times. The vast majority  of firms, however,  are in the mode of using the cheaper
NEPA  power as their main source  and switching  to their own  power sources  when NEPA power
fails or the voltage becomes unstable.  Still other firms, those that cannot afford to install their
own generators,  are captive  to NEPA and reduce or shut down operations  when NEPA power
fails.
The incidence  of public sector nonperformnance  varies widely  among firms according to
the firm's location  within the country  or within the Greater Lagos area. It varies also according
to the sensitivity  of the firmn's  operations  to a steady  power supply. Larger firms are better able
to cope with public sector non-performance  than are smaller firms because the latter cannot  as
easily afford the higher fixed cost of installing  power generators.  In addition to the failures
associated  with the delivery  of public  power, there is also a pricing  failure on the part of NEPA.
NEPA's tariff for electricity  incorporates  a quantity  discount: larger users of public power pay- 40 -
less per quantity used than do smaller users. In 1988, the level of the tariff was quite low
relative to marginal cost. This created a major inefficiency. A general rise in the level of the
tariff structure  would price electricity  more accurately  and would reduce the demand for NEPA
power, thus somewhat  relieving the degree of congestion on the transmission  network. This
would reduce the frequency  of power failures.
The tariff structure  reflects two other forms of inefficiency  because NEPA ignores the
marginal social costs of power generation  in pricing public power in a congested situation.
First, the present tariff does not take into account  the network externality  which arises
because  large users of power impose  a bigger cost on the transmission  network  by causing  more
congestion.  When a large manufacturer  begins operations, it draws more power than does a
small manufacturer  and ties up more network  capacity.  Hence, the probability  of a power failure
is heightened  when large manufacturers  draw power from the NEPA network. We observed,  for
example, that large power surges occur when large manufacturers  draw NEPA power and that
this creates voltage fluctuations  for smaller manufacturers  located nearby. This suggests that
hook up costs should be much higher for large manufacturers  than for small ones to discourage
them from imposing  added congestion  on other users.
Second, most large manufacturers  have installed adequate private power generating
capacity but the low costs of NEPA power induce many of these manufacturers  to treat their
private capacity as stand-by (or back-up) power and to use it only when NEPA power fails.
Instead, NEPA pricing policy would be more efficient if it encouraged more intensive use of
private power generating  capacity.  This would occur in large part by raising tariffs to more
fully reflect the marginal costs of production.  But further tilting of the tariff structure in favor- 41 -
of smaller users is needed. This can be done by disconnecting  those larger manufacturers  who
have installed adequate power capacity or by raising the  slope of the tariff so that these
manufacturers would find it in  their best interest to  fully utilize their private generating
capacities.  Such a pricing structure  would  free up public  transmission  network  capacity.  In turn,
this would reduce power failures and would improve the quality of power delivered to the
smaller firms with less adequate  privately installed  capacities.
Because of  these inefficiencies, the  optimal tariff  for  NEPA power would be  a
modification  of the current  NEPA tariff so that the marginal  price charged  to large users is much
higher relative  to the marginal  price charged  to small  users. Indeed, it might  be possible  to lower
the marginal  price paid by small  users and to raise the marginal  price paid by large users in such
a way that NEPA revenues  would  remain  the same. A combination  of differential  hook-up  costs
(i.e., access fees) and unit charges should  be used to do this while raising the overall level of
the tariff for larger firms and, perhaps  reducing  it for smaller firms.
The proposed tariff would satisfy two objectives ;  1) reduction of the total power
purchased from the public sector in order to reduce congestion  and the occurrence of power
failures; 2) fuller utilization  of the privately installed  power generating  capacity.
"Markets for Power": Private Sector Participation
While pricing is a powerful  tool which can be used to partially compensate  for the non-
performance  of the public sector, bigger gains are likely by restructuring  the Nigerian market
for electricity. This market currently consists of NEPA which controls all  generation and- 42 -
distribution  and of private manufacturers  with their own generators.
A major restructuring  of the current situation  would have  two components.  First, NEPA
operations  can be restructured  to improve public  operations.  Second,  current regulations  can be
relaxed to allow new forms of electricity  generation  and trading in the private sector.
NFPA operates as a centralized  protected  public monopoly. A restructuring  of NEPA
should  be based on the theory  of contestable  markets.  According  to this theory, related functions
such as transmission,  distribution  and generation  can be unbundled  according to the degree of
sunk cost in each of t;,ese operations.
Activities  with low sunk costs can easily be performed in the private sector and under
competitive  conditions.  So there is little economic  reason for such activities  to be performed  by
NEPA. Power generation  is characterized  with relatively  low sunk  costs which  assures  a relative
ease of  entry and exit. As long as access to  a public transmission/distribution  network is
guaranteed, many small and large competitive  private power generation  firms would  emerge in
Nigeria. Such firms can compete with NEPA in the provision of power in the various regions
of Nigeria. In addition, NEPA can be broken up into several different power generating  units
serving the different parts of the country, since there is little economic reason to centralize
power generation.
Currently, regulations  do not allow the generation  of power by units other than NEPA.
There are only two non-NEPA providers of power in the country and these have been in
existence  since Nigeria was a British colony.
Unlike power  generation,  the transmission  and distribution  of electricity  is characterized
with high sunk costs and is a natural monopoly. Duplication  of transmission  and distribution- 43 -
networks  by more than one independent  suppliers  leads to ruinous  competition.  The appropriate
policy is to maintain  central control over the transmission/distribution  network and to allow
access  to all providers  of electricity  such  as NEPA, and other  public  providers and private  power
generation  companies  that would emerge.
The continuation  of transmission/distribution  operations  as a monopoly  does not mean
that this monopoly should be in  the public sector. It can be privatized and regulated. A
privatization  of NEPA might  be the only sure way of alleviating  the many operational  difficulties
which currently characterize  transmission  and distribution.
In addition  to these structural  reforms,  arcane  laws and regulations  prohibiting  firms  from
selling  power to one another or from cooperating  in power generation  should be removed. Our
observations  in Nigeria revealed  that many smaller  firms are motivated  to purchase  power from
nearby larger firms which have idle generating capacity in place. Such an arrangement is
mutually  beneficial because it reduces  the average  cost of electricity  for both firms. The large
firm can operate bigger generators  this reducing  average  cost and selling  its excess  power to its
neighbors. The smaller firms avoid the cost of installing  their own generators and buy power
from the larger neighbor who can afford to produce power more cheaply because they are
producing  larger quantities.
Another arrangement that will emerge from liberalizing current restrictions are utility
pools. Under such an arrangement  manufacturers  located  in the same industrial  area might pool
resources to build a shared power plant. Utility pools and large firms which choose to produce
excess power in order to achieve  higher scale economies  should  be allowed to sell any excess
to the transmission  network. If the transmission/distribution  monopoly  acts as a central broker44  -
between  all power producers and demanders,  then each type of supplier will be inclined  to seek
the optimal scale of power production and thus each type of power will be supplied at the
cheapest  possible  cost.
Chart 1  illustrated  the  proposed  market  organization.  The transmission/distribution
network continues  to operate as a natural monopoly. It is either operated by the public sector
or,  preferably, it is  privatized. On the  right side of  the  vertical line, currently existing
arrangements are  shown. All power is  supplied by NEPA. The chief users of  power are
households,  and manufacturers,  large and small. Some  firms are self sufficient  and provide  all
their own power needs, but most firms of all sizes rely in varying degree on their own
generators as well.
On the left side of the vertical  line in Figure 1, we have indicated  the new arrangements
that we expect will emerge in the new market organization.  First, additional  power companies
would be created by the private sector or by the public sector in the event that NEPA is broken
up. Second, some large firms would be allowed to sell their excess power to smaller firms
nearby or  to  sell it  to  the centralized network. Third,  utility pools would emerge as  an
arrangement  of finms  with a shared power plant producing their own power.
In Indonesia  and Thailand, much of the potential  benefits of private sector participation
have been initiated as the government policy whereas in Nigeria the same benefits remain
unrealized because the government  treats NEPA as a protected monopoly.  In Indonesia  and
Thailand, markets for electric power supply  and other infrastructure  services have  been opened
up and the government  encourages  private production  of power. Private utility companies  have
been licensed and there are some  cases of large firms producing  excess power and selling  it to- 45  -
smaller  firms.  Industrial  estates  are common  in Indonesia  and Thailand  and in some cases
provide  their own power  to the establishments  in the estate. As these  emerging  markets  for
power  expand,  the potential  benefits  from private  sector  participation  will be realized.-46  -
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TABLE  1 :  Effects  of atternative  NEPA  tariffs  under  1988  conditions.
(Essential  substitutes  model.)
OPERATING  COST  EMBEDDED  COST  NEPA's COSTS  TOTAL  BENEFIT
p  B X 1000  ESTO  X CHNG  ESTD  X CHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  X  CHNG
0.6  1569.754  1448438.6  0.48  81344.9  0.38  305625.0 14.09 -42470.8  -2.51
0.8  125.984  1434460.0  -0.49  80742.1  -0.37 224475.0  -16.21  47857.9  2.83
1.0  14.530  1429321.1  -0.84  80552.5  -0.60 178667.0  -33.31  96095.3  5.67
1.2  2.189  1427902.0  -0.94  80535.0  -0.62 149096.8  -44.34 125335.6  7.40
1.4  0.391  1427968.9  -0.94  80581.7  -0.56 128262.9  -52.12 144870.3  8.55
1.6  0.078  1428617.9  -0.89  80649.8  -0.48 112704.7  -57.93 158859.4  9.38
1.8  0.0168  1429485.2  -0.83  80722.8  -0.39 100603.6  -62.45 169377.3  10.00
2.8  0.0000147  1433957.6  -0.52  81042.0  0.00  65792.5  -75.44 197657.0  11.67
3.8  0.237E-07  1437495.5  -0.28  81271.8  0.29  49056.2  -81.69 209865.6  12.39
4.8  0.554E-10  1440268.0  -0.08  81444.9  0.50  39178.4  -85.38 216386.6  12.78
5.8  0.168E-12  1442524.6  0.07  81582.4  0.67  32648.2  -87.81 220273.9  13.01
6.8  0.626E-15  1444421.0  0.20  81696.2  0.81  28005.5  -89.55 222745.6  13.15
7.8  0.277E-17  1446054.2  0.32  81792.9  0.93  24532.7  -90.84 224379.8  13.25
8.8  0.141E-19  1447487.4  0.42  81877.0  1.03  21835.7  -91.85 225484.1  13.31
9.8  0.818E-22  1448764.0  0.51  81951.4  1.13  19679.7  -92.65 226236.0  13.36
10.8  0.529E-24  1449914.7  0.59  82018.0  1.21  17916.3  -93.31 226744.4  13.39
11.8  0.378E-26  1450962.1  0.66  82078.2  1.28  16446.7  -93.86 227079.7  13.41
12.8  0.296E-28  1451923.2  0.72  82133.3  1.35  15202.9  -94.32 227288.8  13.42
13.8  0.251E-30  1452811.1  0.79  82184.0  1.41  14136.4  -94.72 227404.2  13.43
14.8  0.230E-32  1453636.4  0.84  82230.9  1.47  13211.7  -95.07 227449.0  13.43
15.2  0.359E-33  1453950.9  0.87  82248.8  1.49  12875.3  -95.19 227451.0  13.43
15.8  0.226E-34  1454407.3  0.90  82274.7  1.52  12402.1  -95.37 227439.9  13.43
16.8  0.237E-36  1455130.5  0.95  82315.6  1.57  11687.3  -95.64 227389.2  13.43
17.8  0.266E-3S  1455811.7  0.99  82354.0  1.62  11051.5  -95.87 227306.2  13.42
18.8  0.314E-40  1456455.5  1.04  82390.2  1.67  10482.2  -96.09 227197.9  13.42
Notes  a) Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  is  5.9X.  Benefits  are  calculated  as the  saving
in total  cost  relative  to that  under  the observed  tariff  with  8=0.5667823  and  0=0.67714.
b) Nuwbers  are in thousand  nairs.- 49 -
TABLE  2  Responses  of selected  firms  to the  optimt tariff  In  1988
(Essentiat  substitutes  model.)
NEPA  ON  X CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POUER  X CHNG  POWER  X CHNG  NEPA  PRICE  EMBEDDED  OTHER  INPUTS  NEPA  OPERATING
(1000l KWh)  (1000  KWh)  PRICE  COST  COST
130  5.0  4097.9  58.0  -10.0  -97.8  4.8  -5.7  -95.8  -7.7
21  7.0  2952.5  55.0  -2.6  -96.8  1.2  -1.4  -95.6  -2.0
154  12.0  1725.3  20.0  -0.5  -94.5  0.2  -0.3  -95.6  -0.4
29  14.0  1470.4  9.0  -8.7  -93.9  4.1  -4.9  -95.8  -7.3
74  16.0  1285.0  26.0  -3.6  -92.9  1.7  -2.0  -95.6  -3.1
84  30.0  659.5  21.0  -4.3  -87.1  2.0  -2.4  -95.7  -4.0
103  50.0  366.7  10.0  -1.1  -78.7  0.5  -0.6  -95.6  -1.2
156  65.0  263.3  20.0  -0.9  -72.6  0.4  -0.5  -95.6  -1.1
25  83.0  187.7  65.0  -0.2  -65.3  0.1  -0.1  -95.6  -0.3
45  110.0  119.7  150.0  -1.5  -54.9  0.7  -0.8  -95.6  -2.3
158  150.0  63.4  40.0  -0.2  -38.9  0.1  -0.1  -95.6  -0.5
42  213.0  16.9  2000.0  -0.1  -14.5  0.0  -0.1  -95.5  -0.6
28  259.0  -3.0  65.0  0.1  3.1  0.0  0.0  -95.5  -1.6
148  322.0  -21.2  322.0  0.1  27.0  0.0  0.1  -95.5  -0.3
91  427.0  -39.8  400.0  0.2  66.4  -0.1  0.1  -95.5  -0.2
48  583.0  -55.3  146.0  2.2  126.4  -1.0  1.2  -95.5  -0.9
a8  765.0  -65.5  510.0  1.3  192.1  -0.6  0.7  -95.5  -0.2
71  1000.0  -73.3  538.0  5.2  284.8  -2.2  2.8  -95.4  -0.1
30  1561.0  -82.6  820.0  2.0  479.6  -0.9  1.1  -95.5  0.2
105  16000.0  -98.1  23.0  14.1  5575.3  -5.7  7.6  -95.2  4.9
20  16275.0  -98.1  958.0  37.8  6258.9  -13.3  19.4  -94.7  12.4
49  21000.0  -98.5  2183.0  12.3  7198.8  -5.0  6.6  -95.2  4.4
106  37769.0  -99.2  9760.0  19.4  13098.6  -7.6  10.3  -95.1  7.2
32  662720.0  -99.9  198816.0  0.9  186781.6  -0.4  0.5  -95.5  0.4
Note  :  The  optimat  tariff  Is  B= 0.356E-36  and  P *  15.2.- 50 -
TABLE  3 :  Effects  of  alternative  NEPA  tariffs  under  mid-1989  conditions.
(Essential  substitutes  modet.)
OPERATING  COST  EMBEDDED  COST  NEPA's COSTS  TOTAL  BENEFIT
p  B X 1000  ESTD  X CHNG  ESTD  X  CHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  X CHNG
0.6  3835.209  1464902.6  1.63  82219.7  1.46  69480.7  14.10 -29692.8  -2.00
0.8  415.938  1450627.0  0.64  81612.3  0.71  51025.9 -16.21  -1954.3  -0.13
1.0  64.728  1445418.0  0.27  81424.4  0.48  40622.4 -33.29  10844.1  0.73
1.2  13.130  1444011.8  0.18  81410.3  0.46  33910.9 -44.31  17146.5  1.15
1.4  3.154  144121.8  0.18  81461.0  0.52  29183.0 -52.08  20485.5  1.38
1.6  0.844  1444824.0  0.23  81532.9  0.61  25652.0 -57.87  22359.2  1.50
1.8  0.244  1445746.7  0.30  81609.5  0.70  22905.1 -62.39  23440.5  1.58
2.0  0.745E-01  1446734.7  0.36  81684.5  0.80  20702.7 -66.00  24059.1  1.62
2.2  0.238E-01  1447721.2  0.43  81755.7  0.88  18895.3 -68.97  24391.2  1.64
2.4  0.786E-02  1448677.4  0.50  81822.4  0.97  17384.1 -71.45  24537.4  1.65
2.6  0.268E-02  1449591.9  0.56  81884.6  1.04  16101.0 -73.56  24558.9  1.65
2.8  0.936E-03  1450460.9  0.62  81942.6  1.11  14997.6 -75.37  24494.8  1.65
3.0  0.335E-03  1451284.8  0.68  81996.7  1.18  14038.2 -76.95  24370.8  1.64
3.2  0.122E-03  1452065.6  0.73  82047.3  1.24  13196.3 -78.33  24204.2  1.63
3.4  0.455E-04  1452805.9  0.79  82094.8  1.30  12451.2 -79.55  24007.5  1.62
3.6  0.172E-04  1453508.6  0.83  82139.5  1.36  11787.2 -80.64  23789.2  1.60
3.8  0.661E-05  1454176.7  0.88  82181.6  1.41  11191.4 -81.62  23555.7  1.59
4.0  0.258E-05  1454812.8  0.93  82221.4  1.46  10654.0 -82.50  23311.6  1.57
4.2  0.102E-05  1455419.5  0.97  82259.1  1.51  10166.6 -83.30  23060.5  1.55
4.4  0.407E-06  1455999.1  1.01  82294.9  1.55  9722.6  -84.03  22804.8  1.53
Notes  a) Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  Is  27X.  Benefits  are calculated  as the  saving
In total  costs  relative  to the  costs  under  the  tariff  with  B=1.55527  and  0=0.67714.
b) NuMbers  are in  thousand  nairs.-51  -
TABLE  4:  Responses  of selected  firms  to the  optim  l tarIff  In  mid-1989
(Essential  substitutes  model.)
NEPA  Omm  X  CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  X CHNNC  POWER  X CHNC  NEPA  PRICE  EMBEDDED  OTHER  INPUJT  NEPA  OPERATN
(1000  KUh)  (1000  KWh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST
130  1.2  8445.7  60.4  -11.8  -98.9  5.7  -6.7  -75.1  -8.2
21  1.6  6818.9  55.6  -3.2  -98.6  1.5  -1.8  -74.3  -2.2
154  2.7  4593.5  20.1  -0.7  -97.9  0.3  -0.4  -74.0  -0.5
29  3.3  3876.7  9.4  -11.5  -97.6  5.6  -6.5  -75.0  -8.3
74  3.7  3617.9  26.5  -5.0  -97.4  2.3  -2.8  -74.4  -3.6
84  6.9  2212.4  21.7  -6.5  -95.8  3.1  -3.7  -74.5  -4.9
103  11.4  1521.3  10.1  -2.0  -93.9  0.9  -1.1  -74.1  -1.5
156  14.8  1235.9  20.2  -1.8  -92.6  0.8  -1.0  -74.1  -1.4
25  18.7  1023.0  65.2  -0.5  -91.1  0.2  -0.3  -74.0  -0.4
45  25.4  791.0  154.3  -4.2  -89.0  1.9  -2.3  -74.2  -3.5
158  34.0  622.8  40.3  -0.9  -86.2  0.4  -0.5  -74.0  -0.8
42  48.4  456.1  2021.1  -1.2  -82.1  0.5  -0.7  -74.0  -1.1
28  59.9  372.9  67.1  -3.3  -79.2  1.5  -1.8  -74.0  -3.1
148  72.9  311.3  323.9  -0.6  -75.8  0.3  -0.3  -74.0  -0.6
91  96.7  233.9  402.5  -0.5  -70.1  0.2  -0.3  -73.9  -0.5
48  135.6  158.8  151.8  -2.5  -61.9  1.1  -1.4  -73.8  -3.0
88  174.8  115.2  519.1  -0.9  -53.8  0.4  -0.5  -73.8  -1.2
71  235.7  -72.1  568.7  -2.1  -42.6  0.9  -1.1  -73.5  -3.4
30  356.5  27.2  834.1  -0.3  -21.5  0.1  -0.2  -73.7  -0.8
105  3748.6  -77.4  24.1  5.1  355.2  -2.2  2.8  -72.5  0.8
20  4019.3  -78.2  1072.3  13.1  391.4  -5.3  7.0  -70.3  2.1
49  4887.0  -81.5  2272.2  4.7  453.2  -2.0  2.6  -72.7  0.9
106  8887.0  -88.0  10297.1  8.2  r7a.5  -3.4  4.4  -72.0  2.2
32  149475.4  -98.5  199182.4  0.5  674.5  -0.2  0.3  -73.9  0.2
Note  :  The  optiml tsriff  Is  So  0.268E-05  and p  *  2.60- 52 -
TABLE  5 :  Effects  of-atternative  NEPA  tariffs  under  1988  conditions.
(Strict  complements  model  with  exogenous  reliability.)
OPERATING  COST  EMBEDDED  COST  NEPA's COSTS  TOTAL  BENEFIT
p  B  x 1000  ESTD  X CHNG  ESTD  X CHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTO  X  CNNG
0.6  1110.834  1442364.2 0.06  81367.7  0.41  295829.4  10.43  *27180.3  -1.60
0.8  181.508  1439551.6  -0.13  81261.8  0.27  224203.7 -16.31  43021.5  2.54
1.0  25.320  1436368.1  -0.35  82434.1  1.72  166908.5 -37.69  100111.4  5.91
1.2  3.412  1434152.0  -0.51  83477.3  3.01  129761.8 -51.56  137277.0  8.11
1.4  0.473  1432858.6  -0.60  84115.7  3.80  106375.2 -60.29  160573.7  9.48
1.6  0.688E-01  1432188.9  -O 64  84428.4  4.18  91076.4 -66.00  175637.3  10.37
1.8  0.105E-01 1431920.0  -0.66  84522.5  4.30  80528.5  -69.94  185830.2  10.97
2.8  0.174E-05 1433166.3  -0.58  83676.1  3.25  55750.6 -79.19  207896.2  12.28
3.8  0.655E-09 1435768.0  -0.40  82324.4  1.59  45604.5 -82.98  214840.6  12.69
4.8  0.421E-12 1438531.8  -0.20  80972.7  -0.08  39682.6 -85.19  217648.4  12.85
5.8  0.380E-15  1441125.9  -0.02  79680.5  -1.68  35649.1  -86.69  218849.2  12.92
6.8  0.433E-18 1443482.9 0.14  78468.8  -3.17  32637.9 -87.82  219325.3  12.95
7.8  0.592E-21 1445637.8 0.29  77347.6  -4.56  30250.0 -88.71  219417.0  12.96
8.8  0.948E-24 1447635.7 0.43  76316.1  -5.83  28280.1 -89.44  219272.5  12.95
Notes  a)  Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  is  5.9X.  Benefits  are  caLcuLated  as the  saving
in  totaL  cost  relative  to  that  under  the  observed  tariff  with  BzO.5667823  and =0.67714.
b) Numbers  are In  thousand  naira.- 53 -
TABLE  6  Responses  of setected  firms  to the  optimal  tariff  In 1988
(Strict  coEptements  model  with  exogenous  reliability.)
NEPA  OWN  X CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  XCHNG  POWER  XCHNG  NEPA  PRICE  EMBEDDED  OTHER  INPUT  EMBEDDED  NEPA  OPERATING
(1000  KWh)  (1000  KWh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST  COST
130  5,0  49.2  58.0  49.2  -100.0  -16.3  -3.0  24.8  -100.0  -2.6
21  7.0  41.9  55.0  41.9  -100.0  -14.5  -0.8  21.4  -100.0  -0.7
154  12.0  7.0  20.0  7.0  -100.0  -3.0  -0.2  3.8  -100.0  -0.2
29  14.0  95.5  9.0  95.5  -100.0  -25.8  -3.8  45.0  -100.0  -3.3
74  16.0  50.4  26.0  50.4  -100.0  -16.6  -1.6  25.4  -100.0  -1.3
84  30.0  35.5  21.0  35.5  -100.0  -12.7  -2.3  18.3  -100.0  -1.9
103  50.0  13.8  10.0  13.8  -100.0  -5.6  -0.7  7.4  -100.0  -0.6
156  65.0  16.2  20.0  16.2  -100.0  -6.5  -0.7  8.7  -100.0  -0.6
25  83.0  22.1  65.0  22.1  -100.0  -8.5  -0.2  11.7  -100.0  -0.2
45  110.0  4.1  150.0  4.1  -100.0  -1.8  -1.9  2.3  -100.0  -1.6
158  150.0  13.6  40.0  13.6  -100.0  -5.5  -0.5  7.3  -100.0  -0.4
42  213.0  0.7  2000.0  0.7  -100.0  -0.3  -0.7  0.4  -100.0  -0.6
28  259.0  71.8  65.0  71.8  -100.0  -21.4  -2.4  35.0  -100.0  -2.1
148  322.0  6.4  322.0  6.4  -100.0  -2.7  -0.4  3.5  -100.0  -0.3
91  427.0  37.9  400.0  37.9  -99.9  -13.3  -0.5  19.5  -100.0  -0.4
48  583.0  5.4  146.0  5.4  -99.9  -2.3  -2.6  3.0  -100.0  -2.2
88  765.0  42.9  510.0  42.9  -95.8  -14.7  -1.2  21.9  -99.5  -1.1
125  903.0  7.5  387.0  7.5  -98.0  -3.2  -0.7  4.1  -99.8  -0.5
71  1000.0  26.5  538.0  26.5  -88.0  -10.0  -3.4  13.9  -98.6  -3.3
30  1561.0  5.2  820.0  5.2  -22.4  -2.2  -0.2  2.9  -92.7  -0.9
105  16000.0  -85.6  23.0  -85.6  1404.4  137.6  .9.5  -65.9  -80.8  3.6
20  16275.0  -85.5  958.0  -85.5  1732.3  136.3  27.6  -65.7  -76.3  10.7
49  21000.0  -88.2  2183.0  -88.2  2650.6  159.1  13.3  -69.4  -71.0  5.7
106  37769.0  -93.8  9760.0  -93.8  2221.3  244.8  8.5  -78.5  -87.1  4.4
32  662720.0  -99.4  198816.0  -99.4  125888.1  905.5  2.6  -94.3  -36.6  1.8
Note  The  optimal  tariff  Is  Bs 0.592E-21  and  n  *  7.6.- 54 -
TABLE 7:  Effects  of  alternative  NEPA  tariffs  under  mid-1989  conditfons.
CStrict  comptements  model with  exogenous  retliability.)
OPERATING  COST  EMBEDDED  COST  NEPA's  COSTS  TOTAL  BENEFIT
B X  1000  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD X CHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTO  X CHNG
0.6  5762.005  1489051.9  3.30  60692.3  -25.11  152158.1  20.64  -66568.4  -4.34
0.8  806.591  1468140.1  1.85  66387.2  -18.08  95881.2  -23.98  -4602.0  -0.30
1.0  118.455  1457490.3  1.11  70422.7  -13.10  66697.7  -47.12  27337.4  1.78
1.2  19.441  1452489.6  0.76  72680.4  -10.31  51059.8  -59.52  43746.1  2.85
1.4  3.576  1450361.1  0.62  73763.0  -8.98  42006.1  -66.70  52479.4  3.42
1.6  0.727  1449740.8  0.57  74146.1  -8.51  36309.1  -71.21  57255.7  3.73
1.8  0.160  1449941.1  0.59  74124.3  -8.53  32438.1  -74.28  59879.3  3.90
2.0  0.379E-01  1450595.2  0.63  73870.5  -8.85  29628.5  -76.51  61274.9  4.00
2.2  0.943E-02  1451498.2  0.70  73485.6  -9.32  27475.8  -78.22  61942.3  4.04
2.4  0.245E-02  1452532.3  0.77  73029.2  -9.88  25753.5  -79.58  62164.7  4.05
2.6  0.660E-03  1453629.2  0.84  72536.8  -10.49  24328.1  -80.71  62107.6  4.05
2.8  0.182E-03  1454749.6  0.92  72029.7  -11.12  23117.1  -81.67  61870.6  4.03
3.0  0.519E-04  1455871.1  1.00  71520.6  -11.75  22067.1  -82.50  61515.0  4.01
3.2  0.151E-04  1456981.3  1.08  71017.1  -12.37  21142.3  -83.24  61079.5  3.98
3.4  0.446E-05  1458073.0  1.15  70523.5  -12.98  20317.5  -83.89  60589.5  3.95
3.6  0.134E-05  1459142.4  1.23  70042.1  -13.57  19574.6  -84.48  60062.1  3.92
3.8  0.411E-06  1460187.6  1.30  69574.1  -14.15  18899.9  -85.02  59509.1  3.88
4.0  0.127E-06  1461207.4  1.37  69119.8  -14.71  18283.1  -85.50  58939.3  3.84
Notes  a)  Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  is  27X.  Benefits  are  calculeted  as the  saving
in  total  costs  relative  to  the  costs  under  the  tariff  with  B=1.55527 and  p=0.67714.
b)  Nlumbers are  in  thousand  naira.- 55 -
TABLE  8  Responses  of selected  firm  to the  optimal  tariff  In  mid-1989
(Strict  comptements  model  with  exogenous  reliabIlity.)
NEPA  OWN  X  CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  XCHNG  POWER  XCHNG  NEPA  PRICE  EMBEDDED  OTHER  INPUT  EMBEDDED  NEPA  OPERATING
(1000  KWh)  (1000  KWh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST  COST
130  2.1  257.2  24.2  257.2  -100.0  -43.3  -9.4  102.5  -100.0  -8.2
21  3.1  222.9  24.2  222.9  -100.0  -40.7  -2.8  91.5  -100.0  -2.4
154  9.6  34.2  15.9  34.2  -100.0  -12.3  -0.8  17.7  -100.0  -0.7
29  4.3  531.7  2.8  531.7  -99.9  -56.0  -10.2  177.7  -99.9  -9.1
74  6.5  269.4  10.6  269.4  -99.9  -44.2  -4.9  106.3  -99.9  -4.3
84  14.4  181.1  10.1  181.1  -99.9  -36.9  -7.6  77.3  -99.9  -6.6
103  33.8  67.7  6.8  67.7  -99.7  -20.6  -2.9  33.2  -99.9  -2.5
156  41.8  79.8  12.9  79.8  -99.5  -23.0  -2t9  38.4  -99.8  -2.4
25  47.6  111.0  37.3  111.0  -99.3  -28.3  -0.9  51.3  -99.6  -0.8
45  95.9  19.2  130.8  19.2  -98.9  -7.5  -8.0  10.2  -99.6  -6.8
158  101.7  65.2  27.1  65.2  -98.1  -20.1  -1.9  32.1  -99.1  -1.6
42  207.4  3.3  1947.7  3.3  -96.7  -1.4  -3.1  1.8  -99.0  -2.7
28  89.9  292.3  22.6  292.3  -94.9  -45.6  -6.1  113.3  -94.4  -6.0
148  261.5  28.2  261.5  28.2  -93.4  -10.5  -1.6  14.8  -97.6  -1.5
91  195.6  143.6  183.2  143.6  -90.1  -32.8  -1.2  63.8  -93.2  -1.3
48  491.2  19.3  123.0  19.3  -82.2  -7.6  -8.6  10.3  -94.0  -8.6
88  324.2  118.3  216.1  118.3  -79.7  -29.4  -2.7  54.1  -87.5  -3.2
71  513.0  66.0  276.0  66.0  -69.6  -20.2  -7.2  32.4  -85.7  -9.5
30  797.7  38.6  419.0  38.6  -49.4  -13.5  -1.5  19.8  -80.2  -2.7
105  4112.0  -47.6  5.9  -47.6  118.7  33.4  3.1  -30.1  -67.7  -1.0
20  4918.6  -52.2  289.5  -52.2  162.0  38.9  9.8  -33.5  -64.6  -0.9
49  7373.8  -63.0  766.5  -63.0  266.7  55.9  6.0  -42.4  -61.8  0.9
106  5817.7  -60.2  1503.4  -60.2  170.1  50.9  2.8  -40.0  -69.7  -0.2
32  334281.9  -97.0  100284.6  -97.0  7557.3  380.2  1.8  -85.8  -36.0  1.2
Note  The  optimal  tariff  is  Be 0.245E-05  and  0  2.4.-56  -
TABLE  9  Effects  of alternative  NEPA  tariffs  under  1988  conditions.
(Strict  complements  modeL  with  endogenous  reliabiLity.  Elasticity  =1%)
OPERATING  COST  EMBEDDED  COST  NEPA's COSTS  TOTAL  BENEFIT
P  B X 1000  ESTD  %  CHNG  ESTD  %  CHNG  ESTD  %CHNG  ESTD  % CHNG
0.5  2333.693  1445011.1  0.25  84642.7  4.45  298708.7  11.51  -32536.2  -1.92
1.0  26.344  1338476.6  -7.15  30219.7 -62.71  496318.0  85.27  -111922.8  -6.61
1.5  0.172  1338904.0  -7.12  40560.4 -49.95  275092.3  2.69  95790.5  5.66
2.0  0.189E-02  1399990.3  -2.88  71474.3 -11.80  109145.6 -59.26  190835.5  11.27
2.5  0.303E-04  1397582.6  -3.04  68627.2 -15.32  96737.6 -63.89  204917.3  12.10
3.5  0.143E-07  1397013.3  -3.08  63593.5 -21.53  82464.3 -69.22  218915.6  12.93
4.5  0.105E-10  1397871.8  -3.02  59378.3 -26.73  73265.5 -72.65  226711.8  13.39
5.5  0.100E-13  1399079.8  -2.94  55764.2 -31.19  66493.2 -75.18  231875.6  13.69
6.5  0.114E-16  1400368.6  -2.85  52578.6 -35.12  61241.2 -T7.14  235528.1  13.91
7.5  0.149E-19  1401664.8  -2.76  49715.2 -38.65  57027.0 -78.71  238196.9  14.07
8.5  0.212E-22  1402942.2  -2.67  47103.2 -41.88  53567.6 -80.00  240174.2  14.18
9.5  0.327E-25  1404186.4  -2.59  44699.3 -44.84  50675.3 -81.08  241651.3  14.27
10.5  0.538E-28  1405400.9  -2.50  42486.6 -47.57  48200.2 -82.01  242765.5  14.34
11.5  0.947E-31  1406598.9  -2.42  40455.9 -50.08  46028.7 -82.82  243610.5  14.38
12.5  0.177E-33  1407790.6  -2.34  38595.6 -52.37  44085.3 -83.54  244247.4  14.42
13.5  0.356E-36  1408979.3  -2.25  36891.4 -54.48  42322.4 -84.20  244717.3  14.45
14.5  0.761E-39  1410166.2  -2.17  35328.4 -56.41  40709.5 -84.80  245047.8  14.47
15.5  0.172E-41  1411351.4  -2.09  33892.4 -58.18  39225.6 -85.36  245258.8  14.48
16.5  0.412E-44  1412531.1  -2.01  32570.2 -59.81  37855.1 -85.87  245368.5  14.49
17.5  0.103E-46  1413697.8  -1.93  31349.9 -61.32  36586.2 -86.34  245395.7  14.49
18.5  0.271E-49  1414842.9  -1.85  30220.9 -62.71  35409.7 -86.78  245357.5  14.49
19.5  0.739E-52  1415963.2  -1.77  29173.7 -64.00  34316.9 -87.19  245265.4  14.48
Notes  a) Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  is  5.9%.  Benefits  are  calculated  as the  saving
in  totat  cost  relative  to that  under  the  observed  tariff  with  B=0.5667823  and 6=0.67714.
b) Numbers  are in thousand  naira.- 57 -
TABLE  10 :  Responses  of selected  firms  to the  optimal  tariff  in 1988
(Strict  complements  mrdet  with  endogenous  reliability.  Elasticity  a  1X)
NEPA  OWN  X CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  XCHNG  POWER  XCHNG  NEPA  PRICE  EMBEDDED  OTHER  INPUT  EMBEDDED  NEPA  OPERATING
(1000  KWh)  (1000  KWh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST  COST
130  5.0  1662.0  58.0  37.6  -100.0  -13.3  -7.3  -7.3  -100.0  -6.8
21  7.0  1654.7  55.0  37.0  -100.0  -13.1  -2.7  19.1  -100.0  -2.6
154  12.0  1162.1  20.0  -1.4  -100.0  0.6  -4.6  -0.8  -100.0  -4.6 29  14.0  1949.7  9.0  60.1  -100.0  -18.9  -13.9  29.8  -100.0  -13.4 74  16.0  1624.5  26.0  34.7  -100.0  -12.4  -7.4  17.9  -100.0  -7.2
84  30.0  1250.3  21.0  5.5  -100.0  -2.3  -15.0  3.0  -100.0  -14.6
103  50.0  1052.5  10.0  -10.0  -99.4  4.8  -12.3  -5.7  -99.7  -12.2 156  65.0  943.6  20.0  -18.5  -90.5  9.5  -9.8  -10.7  -96.2  -10.4
25  83.0  768.5  65.0  -32.2  -71.9  18.9  -1.9  -19.4  -90.6  -2.4
45  110.0  474.5  150.0  -55.1  -96.5  43.0  -37.7  -35.9  -99.2  -37.8
158  150.0  414.2  40.0  -59.8  3.9  50.2  -5.2  -39.7  -79.3  -7.6
42  213.0  327.7  2000.0  -66.6  1712.1  63.1  39.2  -45.5  199.9  -13.5
28  259.0  190.0  65.0  -77.3  -19.9  93.9  -3.9  -56.1  -91.0  -8.3
148  322.0  162.0  322.0  -79.5  485.0  102.9  -2.3  -58.5  -40.7  -8.2 91  427.0  85.7  400.0  -85.5  130.2  136.5  0.0  -65.7  -83.5  -1.7
48  583.0  45.8  146.0  -88.6  696.4  163.5  -8.5  -70.0  -55.1  -37.5
138  793.0  0.2  1780.0  -92.2  190.6  211.5  0.9  -75.6  -88.7  -0.3
71  1000.0  -17.1  538.0  -93.5  524.4  239.0  8.9  -78.1  -80.0  -9.0
30  1561.0  -45.5  820.0  -95.7  1028.3  308.5  4.8  -82.6  -76.2  -1.8
105  16000.0  -94.4  23.0  -99.6  4748.9  1031.5  14.5  -95.1  -89.6  6.7
20  16275.0  -94.5  958.0  -99.6  6269.3  1031.9  45.0  -95.1  -86.3  21.1
49  21000.0  -95.6  2183.0  -99.7  9460.8  1157.1  20.7  -95.7  -83.8  10.4 106  37769.0  -97.6  9760.0  -99.8  6582.8  1557.5  12.4  -96.9  -93.9  7.6 32  662720.0  -99.8  198816.0  -100.0  456009.4  5339.7  3.4  -99.3  -71.0  2.5
Note  The  optimal  tariff  Is  B= 0.104E-49  and  p * 17.5.- 58 -
TABLE  11 :  Effects  of  alternative  NEiA  tariffs  under  mid-1989  conditions.
(Strict  complements  modeL  with  endogenous  reLiabitity.  ELasticity1X)
OPERATING  COST  EMBEDDED  COST  NEPA's COSTS  TOTAL  BENEFIT
9  B  X 1000  ESTD  X CHNG  ESTO  X CHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  X  CHNG
0.5  17104.120  1509412.3  4.71  52690.6 -34.98  218250.2  41.14 -114344.1 -7.36
1.0  118.832  1375775.2  -4.56  7134.1 -91.20  162894.9  5.34  59675.2  3.84
1.5  1.610  1411133.1  -2.10  48393.1 -40.28  64397.1 -58.36  96172.6  6.19
2.0  0.412E-01 1408239.1  -2.31  43747.4 -46.02  52976.3 -65.74  107398.1  6.91
2.5  0.137E-02 1409023.8  -2.25  39553.8 -51.19  46215.2 -70.11  111545.7  7.18
3.0  0.523E-04 1410814.5  -2.13  35931.6 -55.66  41463.9 -73.19  113221.2  7.28
3.5  0.220E-05 1412945.1  -1.98  32831.3 -59.49  37827.4 -75.54  113743.4  7.32
4.5  0.483E-08 1417511.0  -1.66  27907.7 -65.56  32462.0 -79.01  113091.6  7.28
5.5  0.132E-1O 1422083.1  -1.35  24238.2 -70.09  28605.9 -81.50  111332.5  7.16
6.5  0.429E-13 1426483.9  -1.04  21422.0 -73.57  25671.1 -83.40  109072.7  7.02
7.5  0.159E-15 1430655.6  -0.75  19195.9 -76.31  23355.8 -84.90  106590.1  6.86
8.5  0.659E-18 1434573.7  -0.48  17385.0 -78.55  21484.8 -86.11  104036.9  6.69
9.5  0.298E-20 1438241.3  -0.22  15876.3 -80.41  19942.1 -87.10  101494.7  6.53
10.5  0.146E-22 1441688.0  0.01  14600.4 -81.98  18644.7 -87.94  98994.5  6.37
11.5  0.763E-25 1444947.4  0.24  13510.6 -83.33  17534.4 -88.66  96545.0  6.21
12.5  0.426E-27 1448046.2  0.46  12571.6 -84.49  16571.1 -89.28  94148.9  6.06
13.5  0.252E-29 1451004.0  0.66  11755.9 -85.49  15726.0 -89.83  91807.7  5.91
14.5  0.158E-31 1453835.7  0.86  11041.7 -86.37  14977.7 -90.31  89521.8  5.76
15.5  0.104E-33 1456553.4  1.05  10411.9 -87.15  14310.1 -90.75  87291.2  5.62
16.5  0.721E-36 1459166.9  1.23  9852.7 -87.84  13710.3 -91.13  85115.2  5.48
17.5  0.521E-38 1461684.6  1.40  9353.1 -88.46  13168.3 -91.48  82992.9  5.34
18.5  0.392E-40 1464113.9  1.57  8904.2 -89.01  12675.8 -91.80  80922.9  5.21
19.5  0.307E-42 1466461.1  1.73  8498.8 -89.51  12226.2 -92.09  78903.7  5.08
Notes  a) Cost-recovery  ratfo  for  manufacturing  is  27X.  Benefits  are  calculated  as the  saving
in total  costs  relative  to the  costs  under  the  tariff  with  B=1.55527  and  0=0.67714.
b) Numbers  are in  thousand  naira.- 59 -
TABLE  12  Responses  of selected  firms  to the  optimal  tariff  in  mid-1989
(Strict  comptements  modet  with  endogenous  reliability.  Elasticity=1X)
NEPA  OWN  X CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  XCHNG  POtlER  XCHNG  NEPA  PRICE  EMBEDDED  OTHER  INPUT  EMBEDDED  NEPA  OPERATING
(1000  KWh)  (1000  KWh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST  COST
130  2.4  3347.4  13.9  467.9  -100.0  -53.9  -16.3  161.8  -99.8  -15.1
21  3.6  3081.2  14.0  424.1  -99.9  -52.2  -5.5  150.4  -99.5  -5.1
154  15.5  831.6  12.7  53.5  -99.8  -17.4  -4.8  26.8  -99.6  -4.7
29  4.4  4627.2  1.4  678.8  -99.6  -60.0  -19.0  211.8  -96.7  -19.0
74  7.3  2887.1  5.9  392.1  -99.5  -50.9  -10.7  141.8  -97.2  -10.5
84  16.9  1619.1  5.9  183.2  -98.7  -37.1  -18.0  78.0  -95.7  -18.3
103  47.0  775.7  4.7  44.3  -95.7  -15.1  -11.4  22.5  -92.7  -12.0
156  56.9  729.3  8.7  36.6  -93.5  -13.0  -9.4  18.9  -89.6  -10.4
25  62.5  744.0  24.2  39.0  -91.2  -13.7  -2.2  20.0  -85.6  -2.6
45  145.2  260.8  98.0  -40.6  -88.7  26.1  -34.1  -25.0  -92.1  -36.9
158  144.0  376.6  19.0  -21.5  -77.8  11.4  -5.4  -12.5  -79.5  -7.2
42  384.3  218.3  1785.1  -47.6  29.4  33.4  0.5  -30.1  -20.3  -18.5
28  93.9  539.0  11.7  5.3  -86.2  -2.3  -7.7  2.9  -82.9  -11.0
148  417.7  143.8  206.7  -59.8  -16.0  50.2  -3.7  -39.7  -60.4  -7.9
91  231.1  234.3  107.1  -44.9  -65.2  30.5  -1.3  -28.1  -77.5  -2.5
48  646.4  58.8  80.1  -73.8  -1.2  81.8  -17.1  -52.4  -69.6  -35.8
88  367.4  131.5  121.2  -61.9  -48.6  53.7  -2.1  -41.4  -77.0  -5.3
71  600.1  58.3  159.7  -73.9  -20.5  82.1  -3.9  -52.5  -75.7  -15.7
30  970.6  12.2  252.2  -81.5  30.6  112.3  0.3  -60.8  -71.6  -4.4
105  3915.3  -65.4  2.8  -94.3  253.7  258.7  5.1  -79.5  -76.3  -0.4
20  4745.3  -69.4  138.2  -95.0  347.7  278.9  16.5  -80.9  -73.5  1.6
49  7652.1  -78.9  393.5  -96.5  579.2  347.4  9.8  -84.5  -72.3  2.6
106  5017.0  -72.5  641.4  -95.5  299.6  297.6  4.2  -82.0  -78.8  0.7
32  413403.4  -99.1  61357.4  -99.9  20145.4  1720.2  2.5  -97.3  -64.5  1.8
Note  The optimal  tariff  is  B= 0.220E-08  and  P  =  3.5.- 60 -
TABLE  13  :  Summary  of  the  aggregate  effects  of  the  optimal  NEPA  tariffs
| Essentiat  Substitutes  Model  Strict  Complements  Model
IW  |  Exogenous  Retiability  Endogenous  ReliabiLity  (1X)1  Endogenous  Retiabifty  (2X
|  1988'  mid-1989 2 1988'  mid-1989
2 1988'  mid-1989 2 1988'  mid-1989 2
p  15.2  2.60  7.60  2.4  17.5  3.5  19.5  4.0
NEPA  output  -95.2%  -73.56X  -88.54%  -79.58%  -86.34X  -75.54X  -84.16%  -74.71X
Embedded  output  +  1.86X  + 1.36%  -78.62X  -81.67%  -95.98X  -95.48X  -99.41X  -99.39X
Operating  cost  (a)  4 0.86X  +  0.56X  +  0.26X  +  0.772  -1.93X  -1.98X  -3.32X  -3.35X
NEPA  revenue (b)  -95.22  -73.56%  -88.54X  -79.58X  -86.34X  -75.54X  -84.16X  -74.71X
Embedded  cost  +1.492  +1.04X  -4.29X  -9.88X  -61.32%  -59.48X  -86.56X  -85.76X
NEPA  cost  (c)  -95.22  -73.56X  -88.54X  -79.58X  -86.34X  -75.54X  -84.16X  -74.71X
Total  benefit  4  -13.43X  -1.652  -12.96X  -4.05X  -14.492  -7.322  -15.36X  -9.04X
Unreliabilfty  (W)  N  I/A  N/A  fixed  j  fixed  -80.78%  j  -71.24X  -97.18X  -94.40X
Changes  computed  retative  to  the  actual  1988  tariff  (p  a 0.67714,  8  0.56678).
2  Changes  computed  relative  to  the  actuat  mid-1989  tariff  (P a  0.67714,  B  =  1.55528).
3  NLuber  in  parentheses  is  the  elasticity  of  unreliability  with  respect  to  aggregate  purchases  from  NEPA.
Benefits  are  measured  as  savings  in  totat  social  cost  which  is  a - b  + c.- 61 -
TABLE  14 :  Aggregate  cost  shares  of  inputs  In  social  cost  and  In private  operating  cost.
(Nigeria  sample,  1988  and  Indonesia  sample,  1992)
Shares  in  social  cost  Shares  In  operating  cost
Nigeria  Indonesia  Nigeris  Indonesia
Labor  and  materials  a/  79.4  X  96.4  X  93.3X  95.8  X
Embedded  electricity  b/  4.8  X  2.3  X  5.6  X  2.5  X
NEPA  or  PLN  electricitycL  15.8  X  1.3  X  -.
Payments  to  NEPA  or PLN  -.  _  1.1  %  1.7  X
Total  100.0  X  100.0  X  100.0  X  100.0  X
Payments  to  NEPA  or PL  20.0  X  65  X
as X of the  cost  of
embedded  electricity
ML Used  by  manufacturing  firms  In  primary  production.
b/  Costs  of all inputs  in embedded  production  of electric  power.
c/  Costs  of all iriputs  used  by  NEPA  and PLN.-62  -
TABLE  15 :  Effect  of alternative  PLN tariffs  under  1992  conditions.
(Strict  comptements  model  with  exogenous  reliability.)
OPERATING  COST  EMBEDED  COST  PLN's  COST  TOTAL  BENEFIT
p  B X 1000  ESTD  X  CHNG  ESTD  X CHNG  ESTD  X CHNG  ESTO  X CHNG
0.60  2589615.147  696018504.6  0.71  17268485.3  -0.38  11797875.8  51.81  -3043616.6  -0.44
0.65  1690904.717  694535609.8  0.50  17350726.1  0.10  10829286.8  39.35  -2009649.0  -0.29
0.70  1118490.827  693419692.7  0.33  17395325.2  0.36  10027914.5  29.04  -1265156.6  -0.18
0.75  748361.268  692580358.4  0.21  17410861.8  0.45  9353946.4  20.36  -738196.9  -0.11
0.80  505847.969  691953286.4  0.12  17403959.2  0.41  8779066.8  12.97  -377373.5  -0.05
0.85  345077.622  691491578.3  0.06  17379757.1  0.27  8282648.8  6.58  -145948.1  -0.02
0.90  237372.327  691160300.3  0.01  17342263.8  0.05  7849348.6  1.00  -15498.6  0.00
0.95  164528.802  690932945.2  -0.03  17294618.3  -0.23  7467539.3  -3.91  34893.4  0.01
1.00  114835.570  690789077.6  -0.05  17239286.1  -0.54  7128265.3  -8.28  21512.3  0.00
1.05  80666.182  690712728.2  -0.06  17178208.2  -0.90  6824526.8 -12.18  -42916.8  -0.01
1.10  56999.749  690691272.2  -0.06  17112914.7  -1.27  6550780.6 -15.71  -148338.2  -0.02
1.60  2264.686  691988100.3  0.13  16400730.6  -5.38  4788457.7 -38.38  -2261978.0  -0.33
2.10  121.186  694088264.5  0.43  15762878.4  -9.06  3863333.1 -50.29  -4790924.3  -0.70
2.60  7.774  696162142.7  0.73  15234762.2 -i2.11  3280889.9 -57.78  -7134756.6  -1.04
3.10  0.565  698064854.3  1.01  14796092.6 -14.64  2876812.1 -62.98  -9224752.5  -1.34
3.60  0.449E-01  699787406.2  1.26  14426720.3 -16.T7  2578836.9 -66.82  -11085411.7  -1.61
4.10  0.384E-02  701349537.4  1.48  14111401.7 -18.59  2349584.5 -69.77  -12753798.1  -1.86
4.60  0.347E-03  702774600.8  1.69  13838903.4 -20.16  2167560.8 -72.11  -14263226.9  -2.07
5.10  0.328E-04  704083530.4  1.88  13600855.0 -21.54  2019446.2 -74.01  -15640805.6  -2.28
5.60  0.324E-05  705293804.9  2.05  13390909.5  -22.75  1896514.4  -75.60  -16908057.1  -2.46
6.10  0.329E-06  706419724.7  2.22  13204172.3  -23.82  1792796.4  -76.93  -18082048.8  -2.63
6.60  0.346E-07  707472960.3  2.37  13036810.2  -24.79  1704066.6  -78.07  -19176409.4  -2.79
7.10  0.372E-08  708463076.7  2.51  12885780.3  -25.66  1627248.3  -79.06  -20202129.9  -2.94
Note  :  a) Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  is 145.6X.  Benefits  are  calculated  as the  saving  In  total
cost  relative  to that  under  the  observed  tariff  with  B-220.920  and  p=  0.90972.
b)  Numbers are  in  thousand  rupiyah.- 63 -
TABLE  16 :  Responses  of selected  firms  to the  optimal  PLN  tariff  In  1992
(Strict  comptements  modeL  with  exogenous  reliability.)
NEPA  OWN  X CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  XCHNG POWER  XCHNG  PLN  PRICE EMBEDDED OTHER  INPUT EMBEDDED  PLN  OPERATING
(1000  Kwh)  (1000  KWh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST  COST
174  6.0  14.4  5.0  14.4  -17.0  -8.7  -0.3  4.5  -9.0  -0.2
81  6.0  2.7  11.0  2.7  -16.5  -1.8  0.0  0.9  -17.9  0.0
598  6.0  1.9  564.0  1.9  -16.5  -1.3  0.0  0.6  -18.5  0.0
399  7.0  13.8  40.0  13.8  -16.4  -8.4  -0.1  4.3  -8.9  -0.1
565  7.0  0.4  150.0  0.4  -15.9  -0.3  0.0  0.1  -19.1  0.0
472  14.0  7.3  2.0  7.3  -13.8  -4.7  -0.4  2.3  -11.4  -0.3
430  22.0  2.7  21.0  2.7  -12.0  -1.8  -0.1  0.9  -13.5  -0.1
613  59.0  8.6  2.0  8.6  -8.7  -5.4  -0.4  2.7  -5.1  -0.6
353  105.0  6.1  59.0  6.1  -6.5  -4.0  -0.5  2.0  -4.9  -0.9
609  150.0  4.7  10.0  4.7  -5.1  -3.1  -0.1  1.5  -4.8  -0.2
438  211.0  3.3  11.0  3.3  -3.7  -2.2  0.0  1.1  -4.7  0.0
262  238.0  2.4  5.0  2.4  -3.2  -1.6  -0.2  0.8  -5.1  -0.3
344  292.0  2.1  11.0  2.1  -2.4  -1.4  -0.1  0.7  -4.5  -0.3
282  325.0  1.2  250.0  1.2  -1.9  -0.8  0.0  0.4  -4.9  0.0
219  446.0  0.5  24.0  0.5  -0.6  -0.3  0.0  0.2  -4.3  -0.1
703  935.0  -2.2  690.0  -2.2  2.6  1.5  0.0  -0.7  -3.9  0.0
3  1667.0  -4.6  15.0  -4.6  5.1  3.2  0.2  -1.5  -3.9  0.0
289  3129.0  -6.2  17.0  -6.2  7.9  4.4  0.6  -2.0  -3.1  0.2
260  3164.0  -6.7  167.0  -6.7  8.0  4.8  0.3  -2.2  -3.6  0.1
88  6200.0  -7.0  5500.0  -7.0  11.0  5.0  0.1  -2.3  -1.2  0.0
65  7596.0  -8.1  4000.0  -8.1  11.9  5.9  1.0  -2.7  -1.5  0.4
98  10186.0  -10.3  1420.0  -10.3  13.4  7.6  1.7  -3.5  -2.6  1.1
Note:  The  optimal  tariff  is  r164.53  and  F  0.95.-64  -
TABLE  17 :  Effects  of alternative  PLN tariffs  under  1992  conditions
(Strict  complements  model  with  endogenous  reliability.  Elasticity  =1%)
PRIMARY  COST  EMBEDED  COST  PLN's  COST  TOTAL  BENEFIT
B  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  XCHNG
0.60  2539.427  696175763.4  0.73  18800349.9  8.46  11152745.9  43.51  -3499766.1  -0.51
0.65  1667.908  694742197.4  0.53  18581806.2  7.20  10354532.1  33.24  -2436039.7  -0.35
0.70  1108.503  693630386.5  0.36  18348508.1  5.85  9688851.2  24.67  -1632862.5  -0.24
0.75  744.351  692764594.1  0.24  18107479.2  4.46  9123860.8  17.40  -1028993.9  -0.15
0.80  504.435  692091058.1  0.14  17863642.7  3.06  8637269.5  11.14  -581020.7  -0.08
0.85  344.699  691570530.5  0.07  17620370.9  1.65  8212973.6  5.68  -257168.7  -0.04
0.90  237.344  691173535.0  0.01  17379957.3  0.27  7839050.3  0.87  -33493.4  0.00
0.95  164.575  690877379.3  -0.03  17143940.9  -1.09  7506479.6  -3.41  108513.6  0.02
1.00  114.861  690664229.8  -0.06  16913329.7  -2.43  7208307.9  -7.25  183460.7  0.03
1.05  80.650  690519837.5  -0.09  16688755.9  -3.72  6939085.5  -10.71  203069.8  0.03
1.1  56.949  6904326T7.3  -0.10  16470595.5  -4.98  6694475.0  -13.86  176858.4  0.03
1.6  2.231  691249625.7  0.02  14636950.2  -15.56  5068013.5  -34.79  -1393892.7  -0.20
2.1  0.117  693110542.9  0.29  13308406.6  -23.22  4172985.6  -46.30  -3669657.3  -0.53
2.6  0.007  695073079.5  0.57  12313662.7  -28.96  3594414.4  -53.75  -5900360.3  -0.86
3.1  0.515  696941342.3  0.84  11543208.2  -33.41  3187614.4  -58.98  -7957173.8  -1.16
3.6  0.0395E-01  698679493.4  1.10  10929280.3  -36.95  2886202.7  -62.86  -9835028.2  -1.43
4.1  0.0032E-02  700289444.0  1.33  10428032.7  -39.84  2654497.1  -65.84  -11552373.2  -1.68
4.6  0.000279E-03  701782134.9  1.54  10009883.5  -42.25  2471286.5  -68.20  -13129981.0  -1.91
5.1  0.000251E-04  703170285.5  1.75  9654511.8  -44.30  2323059.4  -70.11  -14586833.7  -2.12
5.6  0.000232E-05  704466462.3  1.93  9347937.0  -46.07  2200777.1 -71.68 -15939687.3  -2.32
6.1  0.000221E-06  705682347.7  2.11  9080393.1  -47.61  2098179.8  -73.00  -17203125.7  -2.50
6.6  0.000215E-07  706828324.6  2.27  8844770.2  -48.97  2010817.6  -74.13  -18389594.3  -2.67
7.1  0.000213E-08  707913330.9  2.43  8635638.5 -50.18  1935456.8 -75.10 -19509529.7  -2.84
Note :  a) Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  is  145.6%.  Benefits  are  calculated  as the  saving  in total
cost  relative  to that  under  the  observed  tariff  with  B=220.920  and  pz  0.90972.
b) Numbers  are in  thousand  rupiyah.-. 65  -
TABLE  18 :  Responses  of selected  firms  to the  optimal  PLN tariff  in 1992
(Strict  complements  model  with  endogenous  reliability.  Elasticity21X.)
NEPA  OWN  X CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  XCHNG POWER  XCHNG  PLN  PRICE  EMBEDDED OTHER  INPUT EMBEDDED  PLN  OPERATING
(1000  Kwh)  (1000  Kwh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST  COST
174  6.0  57.7  5.0  37.6  -44.6  -19.4  -0.9  10.9  -24.3  -0.7
81  6.0  21.8  11.0  6.3  -45.3  -4.0  -0.1  2.0  -42.3  -0.1
598  6.0  19.8  564.0  4.5  45.3  -2.9  -0.1  1.4  -43.3  0.0
399  7.0  55.7  40.0  35.9  -43.4  -18.7  -0.2  10.4  -23.6  -0.1
565  7.0  15.6  150.0  0.9  -44.2  -0.6  -0.1  0.3  -44.2  -0.1
472  14.0  32.6  2.0  15.7  -38.1  -9.4  -1.5  4.8  -28.9  -1.2
430  22.0  20.1  21.0  4.8  -34.4  -3.1  -0.7  1.5  -31.7  -0.5
613  59.0  29.4  2.0  12.9  -24.4  -7.9  -1.3  4.0  -15.2  -1.9
353  105.0  20.6  59.0  5.2  -18.3  -3.4  -1.3  1.7  -14.6  -2.3
609  150.0  15.9  10.0  1.1  -14.3  -0.7  -0.4  0.4  -13.9  -0.8
438  211.0  11.8  11.0  -2.5  -10.2  1.7  0.0  -0.8  -13.1  -0.1
262  238.0  9.5  5.0  -4.5  -8.8  3.1  -0.7  -1.5  -13.5  -1.3
344  292.0  6.7  11.0  -6.9  -6.3  5.0  -0.4  -2.3  -13.4  -1.1
282  325.0  8.3  250.0  -5.5  -4.8  3.9  0.0  -1.8  -10.6  0.0
219  446.0  2.4  24.0  -10.7  -0.7  7.9  -0.1  -3.6  -11.9  -0.6
703  935.0  -6.4  690.0  -18.3  9.6  14.7  0.2  -6.3  -11.1  0.0
3  1667.0  -14.4  15.0  -25.3  18.4  21.8  0.5  -9.0  -12.2  0.0
289  3129.0  -18.6  17.0  -29.0  29.0  26.1  1.9  -10.5  -9.1  0.5
260  3164.0  -20.3  167.0  -30.5  29.0  27.8  1.2  -11.1  -10.9  0.4
88  6200.0  -19.2  5500.0  -29.5  41.9  26.7  0.3  -10.7  -0.7  0.1
65  7596.0  -23.2 4000.0  -33.0  45.6  31.0  3.6  -12.2  -3.1  1.6
98  10186.0  -29.9 1420.0  -38.8  51.1  39.4  5.9  -14.7  -8.2  3.8
Note  The  optfmal  tariff  is  B =  80.675  and  1.=  105- 66 -
TABLE  19 :  Effects  of atternative  PLN  tariffs  under  1992  conditions
(Strict  complements  model  with  endogenous  retiability.  Elasticity  -2X)
PRIMARY  COST  EMBEDED  COST  PLN's  COST  TOTAL  BENEFIT
B  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  XCHNG  ESTD  %CHNG  ESTD  %CHNG
0.60  250.408  696189862.2  0.74  19960244.5  15.15  10651899.5  37.07  -3745933.3  -0.54
0.65  1651.345  694831517.8  0.54  19516925.4  12.60  9986618.4  28.50  -2695945.3  -0.39
0.70  1101.198  693750390.7  0.38  19074697.2  10.04  9426443.8  21.30  -1874537.9  -0.27
0.75  741.387  692883677.3  0.26  18639598.8  7.53  8946062.7  15.12  -1230519.0  -0.18
0.80  503.382  692187099.7  0.16  18215546.7  5.09  8527890.7  9.73  -727781.1  -0.11
0.85  344.414  691628484.3  0.08  17804892.5  2.72  8159338.4  4.99  -339996.1  -0.05
0.90  237.322  691183622.2  0.01  17408917.4  0.43  7831144.1  0.77  -47253.1  -0.01
0.95  164.612  690833679.2  -0.04  17028086.9  -1.76  7536330.4  -3.02  166071.8  0.02
1.00  114.886  690563607.8  -0.08  16662699.9  -3.87  7269498.3  -6.46  312451.7  0.05
1.05  80.648  690361118.4  -0.11  16312392.1  -5.89  7026419.8  -9.59  402268.4  0.06
1.1  56.924  690216067.6  -0.13  15976840.6  -7.83  6803687.2 -12.45  444092.4  0.06
1.6  2.213  690552217.3  -0.08  13295581.8  -23.30  5273604.7 -32.14  -601233.6  -0.09
2.1  0.115  692108385.8  0.14  11475738.4 -33.80  4392140.0 -43.48 -2565911.7  -0.37
2.6  0.007  693883780.1  0.40  10167322.3 -41.34  3808556.0 -50.99 -4611803.3  -0.67
3.1  0.000496  695639816.5  0.66  9175914.1 -47.06  3393309.0 -56.34 -6560307.1  -0.95
3.6  0.037729  697309674.7  0.90  8395178.8 -51.57  3083432.7 -60.32 -8373791.7  -1.22
4.1  0.003051  698878690.3  1.12  7765645.3 -55.20  2843725.0 -63.41  -10053910.4  -1.46
4.6  0.000259  700348580.5  1.34  7249208.5 -58.18  2652978.4 -65.86  -11612209.9  -1.69
5.1  0.228146E-07  701725513.4  1.54  6818912.0 -60.66  2497647.5 -67.86  -13061136.5  -1.90
5.6  0.207184E-08  703017320.5  1.72  6455244.0 -62.76  2368665.3 -69.52  -14412724.7  -2.10
6.1  0.192837E-09  704232663.1  1.90  6143967.0  -64.55  2259752.4  -70.92  -15678546.7  -2.28
6.6  0.183253E-10  705380248.3  2.07  5874551.1  -66.11  2166442.3  -72.12  -16869379.9  -2.45
7.1  0.17M 22E-11  706468207.9  2.22  5639074.4  -67.47  2085484.4  -73.16  -17994862.8  -2.62
Note  a) Cost-recovery  ratio  for  manufacturing  Is  145.6%.  Benefits  are  calculated  as the  saving  in  total
cost  relative  to that  under  the  observed  tariff  with  B=220.920  and Pz  0.90972.
b)  Numbers  are In  thousand  ruplyah.- 67 -
TABLE  20:  Responses  of setected  firms  to  the  optimal  PLN  tariff  in  1992
(Strict  complements  model  with  endogenous  reliability.  Elasticity=2X.)
NEPA  OUN  X CHANGE  IN  MARGINAL  PRICES  AND  OTHER  COSTS
FIRM  POWER  XCHNG  POWER  XCHNG  PLN  PRICE EMBEDDED OTHER  INPUT EMBEDDED  PLN  OPERATING
(1000  Kwh)  (1000  KVh)  PRICE  COSTS  COST  COST  COST
174  6.0  87.4  5.0  36.1  -53.3  -18.8  -1.1  10.5  -27.7  -1.0
81  6.0  46.0  11.0  6.0  -54.5  -3.9  -0.2  1.9  -45.1  -0.2
598  6.0  43.9  564.0  4.5  -54.6  -2.9  -0.1  1.4  -45.9  0.0 399  7.0  84.7  40.0  34.1  -52.0  -18.0  -0.2  10.0  -26.7  -0.2
565  7.0  38.6  150.0  0.7  -53.4  -0.4  -0.2  0.2  -46.6  -0.1
472  14.0  53.8  2.0  11.7  -46.3  -7.2  -2.2  3.6  -31.6  -2.0
430  22.0  40.8  21.0  2.2  -41.9  -1.5  -1.1  0.7  -32.4  -1.0
613  59.0  39.9  2.0  1.6  -30.0  -1.1  -1.7  0.5  -19.0  -2.5
353  105.0  27.7  59.0  -7.3  -22.6  5.2  -1.3  -2.4  -18.3  -2.7
609  150.0  21.7  10.0  -11.6  -17.6  8.7  -0.6  -3.9  -17.0  -1.1
438  211.0  16.8  11.0  -15.2  -12.4  11.8  0.0  -5.2  -15.4  -0.1
262  238.0  14.5  5.0  -16.9  -10.5  13.3  -1.0  -5.8  -15.3  -2.1
344  292.0  8.9  11.0  -20.9  -7.5  17.2  -0.4  -7.3  -16.7  -1.5
282  325.0  15.5  250.0  -16.2  -5.0  12.7  0.0  -5.5  -9.3  0.0
219  446.0  4.2  24.0  -24.4  -0.1  20.8  -0.1  -8.6  -14.0  -0.9
703  935.0  -7.6  690.0  -32.9  13.6  31.0  0.4  -12.1  -13.2  0.0
3  1667.0  -18.4  15.0  -40.8  25.2  42.5  0.7  -15.6  -15.5  0.0
289  3129.0  -23.5  17.0  -44.4  40.3  48.8  2.4  -17.3  -11.2  0.5
260  3164.0  -25.6  167.0  -46.0  40.2  51.7  1.5  -18.1  -13.8  0.5
88  6200.0  -22.9  5500.0  -44.0  59.9  48.0  0.4  -17.1  2.0  0.1 65  7596.0  -28.5  4000.0  -48.1  65.0  55.8  5.1  -19.1  -2.5  2.1
98  10186.0  -37.2  1420.0  -54.4  72.2  70.0  8.0  -22.5  -10.6  5.2
Note  The  optimal  tariff  Is  B a  56.925  and p  1.10- 68 -
TABLE  21:  Summary  of the  Aggregate  Effects  of the  Optimat  PLN  Tariffs
Strict  CompLements  Model  (1992)"
Exogenous  Reliability  Endogenous  Reliability'  Endogenous  Reliability
2'
l  _____________________________  (1X)  (2X)
P  0  0.95  1.05  1.10
PLN  Output  -3.91%  -10.71X  -12.45X
Emrbedded  output  -2.96X  -5.93X  -7.16X
Operating  Cost  (a)  -0.03X  -0.09X  -0.13X
PLN  Revenue  (b)  -3.91X  -10.71X  -12.45X
Embeledded  Cost  -0.232  -3.72X  -7.83X
PLN  Cost (c)  -3.912  -10.712  -12.452
Total  benefit'  -0.01X  -0.032  -0.06X
Unreliability  en  )  fixed  -4.12X  -9.40X
1/ Changes  computed  relative  to the  actual  1992  tariff
(p  *  0.90972,  B * 220.920)
2/  Number  in  parentheses  is  the  elasticity  of  unreliability  with  respect  to aggregate  purchases  from  PLN.
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